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Volume I: ITA/I Report 
1.0  AUTHORIZATION AND NOTIFICATION  
The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) has a zero-fault-tolerant design related to an inadvertent firing 
of the primary reaction control jets on the Orbiter during mated operations with the International 
Space Station (ISS).  Failure modes identified by the program as a wire-to-wire “smart” short or 
a Darlington transistor short resulting in a failed-on primary thruster during mated operations 
with ISS can drive forces that exceed the structural capabilities of the docked Shuttle/ISS 
structure.   Mr. Bryan O’Connor, NASA’s Chief Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) 
Officer, initiated an assessment on April 19, 2004, by requesting the NESC to review the issue 
and render a technical opinion on the probability of a catastrophic failure related to this scenario.  
Other stakeholders include Mr. William Parsons, the SSP Manager, and Mr. William 
Gerstenmaier, the ISS Program Manager.  The SSP liaison assigned is Mr. Donald Totton, 
Deputy Manager, SSP S&MA. 
 
The ITA/I Plan was developed by Dr. Richard Gilbrech and approved by the NESC Review 
Board (NRB) on June 18, 2004.  The scope of the ITA/I was a combination of review and 
independent analyses that included: 
 
1. Review of statistical methods and assumptions for wire-to-wire “smart” short and Darlington 
transistor pair failure Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) conducted by the Program. 
2. Evaluation of Darlington pair wear-out mechanisms, wire-short-related mechanisms, 
corresponding program mitigations, and pros/cons of redesigned RJD avionics. 
3. Development of a NESC position on failure probability estimates. 
4. Recommendation as appropriate of any risk mitigation that the program has not considered or 
independent testing that could reduce uncertainty in risk predictions.  
 
The ITA/I lead and the NESC Director briefed Mr. O’Connor at NASA Headquarters on August 
25, 2004, along with the SSP and ISS stakeholders (vehicle, engineering and S&MA 
management representatives from both Programs) on the preliminary results of the assessment.  
Inputs from this meeting were incorporated into subsequent briefs to the SSP Integration Control 
Board on September 28, 2004, the SSP Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) on 
September 30, 2004, and the SSP/ISS Joint PRCB on October 4, 2004.   
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4.0  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
The SSP has recognized that a zero-fault-tolerant design related to an inadvertent firing of the 
primary reaction control system (RCS) jets exists on the Orbiter during mated operations with 
the ISS.  There are 44 RCS thrusters on each Orbiter, 38 primary thrusters (870 lbf thrust each) 
and 6 vernier thrusters (24 lbf thrust each).  ISS loads analysis has shown limit load exceedances 
of structural interfaces and solar array assemblies from an inadvertent primary thruster firing.  
The loads exceedances increase in severity as the moment of inertia of ISS increases toward 
complete assembly.  Catastrophic failure for both SSP and ISS would likely result from those 
loads exceedances. 
 
The SSP requires critical systems to be “fail ops/fail safe,” or dual fault tolerant.  In the past, 
effective mitigation strategies for the zero-fault-tolerant RJD have included removal of power 
from the RJD box when the function is not required, and a provision for manual RCS propellant 
manifold shutdown by the crew, if necessary.  RJD power is also removed during extravehicular 
activity (EVA) and during the majority of ground operations when personnel are in proximity to 
a fueled Orbiter.  The RJD is powered on for a short period (~18 hours) during flight turnaround 
ground processing to perform the RJD functional check, with access limited to essential 
personnel only.   
 
This assessment addressed three of the identified root causes of an inadvertent primary thruster 
firing: failure (fail short) of the RJD Darlington pair transistor switch, a wire-to-wire “smart” 
short in the RJD wiring bundle between a hot (powered) wire and a thruster command wire, and 
a pin-to-pin short (hot) in the RJD connectors.  A pin-to-pin short could occur either between 
two thruster command pins resulting in two jets firing instead of the one selected or between a 
power pin and a command pin where the jet would fire inadvertently.  The Shuttle Program 
determined a range of probabilities related to the wire-to-wire “smart” short (1.4 x 10-4 to 6.4 x 
10-8) per flight and an estimate of the RJD Darlington pair failure probability (9.5 x 10-8) per 
flight.  The pin-to-pin short was deemed remote and NESC concurred with the Program’s 
accepted risk rationale. 
 
Specifically placed outside the scope of this assessment were two other inadvertent firing failure 
modes identified by the Program: multiplexer/demultiplexer (MDM) erroneous output and 
general purpose computer (GPC) erroneous output.  These were judged by the Program to be 
improbable.  A software modification has been approved and is being implemented by the 
Program for the next two flights.  This will automatically close the RCS propellant manifold 
feeding the failed-on thruster if an inadvertent firing is sensed during mated Shuttle/ISS 
operations.  The modification will limit the inadvertent thruster firing duration to less than 1.5 
seconds that, according to analysis conducted by the Program, will prevent exceeding structural 
limits.  Review of this software modification was also purposefully placed outside the scope of 
this assessment. 
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Several risk mitigation options for the wire-to-wire “smart” short and Darlington pair failure 
modes were considered by the SSP ranging from replacing RJD wire with new shielded cable to 
redesigning the RJD avionics box with high-side/low-side switching.  The Orbiter Program 
recommended the high-side/low-side switching option for implementation at the April 15, 2004, 
Space Shuttle PRCB.  This option eliminates the risk from both Darlington pairs and wire-to-
wire “smart” shorts.  The first ship set of redesigned RJDs would be delivered for installation in 
25 months after authority to proceed with an estimated cost of $29M.  The new high-side/low-
side switching would provide single-fault-tolerance to failure modes that could result in 
inadvertent thruster firing.  The propellant manifold auto-close software modification is claimed 
to only be effective for the next two flights.  After these two flights (Space Transportation 
System (STS) STS-114/LF1 and STS-121/ULF1.1), the Programs would have to accept the risk 
of a catastrophic inadvertent thruster firing for at least six flights (STS-115/12A to STS-
120/10A).   The RJD fix would then be in effect for the 22 remaining ISS assembly missions 
starting with STS-122.  The SSP Manager’s decision was to not implement this modification and 
discuss the issue at the Joint Shuttle/ISS PRCB.   
 
NESC concluded that the current Critical Items List (CIL) waiver rationale is not adequate since 
it does not consider aging effects for 25+ year old parts; does not capture all credible failure 
modes; and there is a near-instantaneous nature of failure while docked, rendering mitigating 
actions of the crew ineffective.   
 
The assessment team delivered 17 observations, 6 findings and 15 recommendations to the SSP.  
The majority of the technical team and over half of the NRB recommended that the RJD box 
high-side/low-side switch redesign commence immediately.  However, the NESC ultimately 
recommended replacing the RJD wire with new, better-protected wiring, conducting Darlington 
electrical and destructive physical analysis (DPA) tests and adding pre-flight leakage current 
tests by no later than STS-115/12A.  After evaluating that data, NESC will deliver a 
recommendation on the RJD box high-side/low-side switch redesign.  Risk exists that negative 
results could drive the redesign to be a constraint.  Also, a delayed start of a redesign effort 
would expand exposure until the upgraded RJD is installed.  The NESC observed that for 
scenarios having relatively low probability of failure on a single flight, for multiple flights the 
probability of failure accumulates directly according to the number of flights, i.e., 20 times 
greater for 20 flights than for a single flight.  An action plan addressing the 15 NESC 
recommendations was requested and is in work by the SSP. 
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5.0  OVERVIEW OF INITIAL ITA/I PLAN 
The scope of the RJD assessment included a combination of review, independent analyses, and 
tests as follows:   
1. Evaluation of the failure modes and assessment of possibilities.  This included identifying 
any stresses acting on the wire and Darlington transistors. 
2. Review of statistical methods and assumptions for wire-short-related failures and 
Darlington pair failure PRAs conducted by the Program. 
3. Evaluation of Darlington pair wear-out mechanisms, wire-short-related mechanisms, and 
corresponding program mitigations. 
4. Recommendation of any program risk mitigations not considered or independent testing 
that could reduce uncertainty in risk predictions.  
Specifically placed outside the scope of the ITA/I Plan, completed in June 2004, were risks 
posed by the other three failure modes identified by the Program that would result in an 
inadvertent primary reaction jet firing (connector pin-to-pin shorts, MDM erroneous output, and 
GPC erroneous output) and the effectiveness of the software modification to automatically detect 
a failed-on thruster and close the corresponding reaction jet propellant manifold.  Note that over 
the course of the review, sufficient data was provided for the NESC to concur with the 
Program’s accepted risk rationale for the connector pin-to-pin short.  
 
6.0  PROBLEM, PROPOSED SOLUTIONS, RISK ASSESSMENT 
6.1  Problem 
Failure modes which result in a failed-on primary thruster drive forces during mated operations 
with ISS that can exceed the structural capabilities of the docked Shuttle/ISS structure.  The RCS 
thrusters are assigned to four RJD boxes on the Orbiter: 2 fwd and 2 aft — each thruster having 
its own driver.   
 
6.2  Technical Description 
The primary focus of this assessment included a wire-to-wire “smart” short of a powered wire to 
a valve solenoid wire and any RJD Darlington pair transistor failing short.   Figure 6.2-1 
illustrates five potential root causes for inadvertent thrusting and the Program’s risk assessment 
of them. 
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Unacceptable Risk
Accepted Risk
Controlled Risk
Marginal Critical Catastrophic
Improbable
Remote
Infrequent
Probable
1. Wire-to-Wire Short
2. Darlington Pair*
3. Pin-to-Pin Short*
4. MDM Erroneous 
Output*
5. GPC Erroneous 
Output
* - 1999 Hazard Report ORBI 055 (update in-work)
Figure 6.2-1.  Five Root Causes of Inadvertent Thruster Firing 
 
a. Consequences from National Space Transportation System (NSTS) 22254: 
- Catastrophic: Hazard could result in a mishap resulting in fatal injury to personnel 
and/or loss of one or more major elements of the flight vehicle or ground facility. 
- Critical: Hazard could result in serious injury to personnel and/or damage to flight or 
ground equipment which would cause mission abort or a significant program delay. 
- Marginal: Hazard could result in a mishap of minor nature inflicting first-aid injury to 
personnel and/or damage to flight or ground equipment which can be tolerated without 
abort or repaired without significant delay. 
b. Likelihoods based on NSTS 07700-10-Master Verification Plan (MVP)-01: 
- Probable:  Will occur several times in the life of the Program.  A general guideline for 
likelihood of occurrence would be 1 in 12 to 125 flights (8 x 10-2 > X > 8 x 10-3). 
- Infrequent:  Likely to occur sometime in the life of the Program.  A general guideline 
for likelihood of occurrence would be 1 in 125 to 1,250 flights (8 x 10-3 > X > 8 x 10-4). 
- Remote: Unlikely, but possible, to occur in the life of the Program. A general guideline 
for likelihood of occurrence would be 1 in 1,250 to 12,500 flights (8 x 10-4 > X > 8 x    
10-5). 
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- Improbable: So unlikely that it can be assumed occurrence may not be experienced in 
the life of the Program.  A general guideline for likelihood of occurrence would be 
greater than 1 in 12,500 flights (X < 8 x 10-5). 
 
6.3  Proposed Solutions 
Proposed solutions include identifying all failure modes resulting in inadvertent firing, 
evaluating the failure modes and then assessing the probabilities.  These include identifying any 
stresses acting on the wire and Darlington transistors, and reviewing statistical methods and 
assumptions used by the Program for wire-short-related failures and Darlington pair failure 
PRAs.   An independent, dynamic PRA via fault tree analysis will then be developed and 
anchored with independent analysis and testing.  Recommendations, as appropriate, will be made 
for any program risk mitigations not considered or independent testing that could reduce 
uncertainty in risk predictions. 
6.4  Risk Assessments  
Mr. Bryan O’Connor, NASA’s Chief S&MA Officer, requested a review and independent PRA 
on April 19, 2004.   The NESC PRA, located in Volume II, Appendix C of this report, was 
conducted by Dr. Vitali V. Volovoi [6] (as part of the ITA/I) to quantify and describe the risks of 
failures leading to the inadvertent firing of thrusters while the Orbiter is docked to the ISS.  Risk 
mitigations are also discussed in Section 7.2 of this report. 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Report 
Document #: 
RP-05-18 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Space Shuttle Orbiter Reaction Jet Driver (RJD) 
Independent Technical Assessment/Inspection Report 
Page #: 
12 of 155 
 
7.0  DATA ANALYSIS 
7.1  Results of Tests and Analyses 
7.1.1  Orbiter Project Proposed Solution 
The Orbiter Project’s proposed solution was to modify the RJD with high-side and low-side 
switching which would be effective for both the wire-to-wire “smart” short and Darlington pair 
failure modes.   In addition to the design changes in the RJD avionics box, this would involve a 
minor wiring mod at the first bulkhead connector in the wiring chain from the thruster valve 
toward the RJD to implement the low side return.  Due to the time required for implementation, 
the Orbiter considered accepting risk for 6 flights to include STS-115/12A to STS-120/10A.  The 
RJD fix would then be effective for the 22 remaining flights starting with STS-122.  The SSP 
Manager’s decision was to not implement this modification and discuss the issue at the Joint 
Shuttle/ISS PRCB.   
7.2  Risk Mitigations  
This section will discuss the Program’s risk mitigations for the wire-to-wire “smart” short, the 
Darlington pair failure, and the connector pin-to-pin short.  Note that while the pin-to-pin short 
was originally placed outside the scope of the assessment, over the course of the review 
sufficient data was provided for the NESC to concur with the Program’s accepted risk rationale 
on this hazard.  Modeling was developed to examine the wire-to-wire “smart” short and its 
evolution of wire damage as a function of time.   The model allows for the estimation of 
significant wire damage for a given Orbiter and flight.  Relevant significant damage included 
damaged and exposed conductors.  Appendix C of this report provides more detail.   
7.2.1  Wire Short Risk Mitigation 
Three approaches were used by the Program to estimate the probability of an inadvertent thruster 
firing caused by a wire-to-wire “smart” short: 
 
1. System reliability approach relies on decomposing the catastrophic event into a set of 
more elementary events and conditions.  If the relative timing of these events is 
irrelevant to the occurrence of the catastrophic event, fault trees or Bayesian (belief) 
networks can be used.  Otherwise, a dynamic framework such as Stochastic Petri nets can 
provide a more accurate description of the probability of occurrence.  The main 
disadvantage of this “white box” approach is that a relatively large number of statistical 
parameters must be provided to characterize elementary events and conditions as well as 
their interactions.  There is a positive side in that these elementary events are usually less 
unique than the system as a whole, and as a result, the required parameters can be 
inferred from the experience gained from other systems and environmental conditions.  
This approach was taken by the risk assessment conducted by Koushik Datta (NASA 
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Ames).  Some of the assumptions used in that study were questionable, and the resulting 
point estimate was dismissed as overly conservative by the Shuttle Program. 
 
2. Observed reliability approach is based solely on past experience of the system under 
consideration.  With this method, the issues of (external) similarities with other systems 
are avoided; however, due to the scarcity of system-specific data, selecting events that are 
significantly similar to the studied catastrophic event is challenging.  A relatively loose 
similarity definition poses the problem of accounting for dissimilarity (such as between 
wire-to-wire vs. wire-to-ground shorts) that is effectively equivalent to the need for event 
decomposition (see item 1 above).  Then again, a more strict definition of similarity leads 
to a small sampling pool, with resulting difficulties for any meaningful statistical 
inference.  This latter approach was selected by the Shuttle Program as the most credible.  
Several deficiencies of this approach provide grounds for doubting the resulting numbers.  
 
3. Observed reliability approach can be complemented by incorporating external data via 
the Bayesian approach.  While theoretically this approach provides a means to 
compensate for the lack of system-specific data, the final results are very sensitive to the 
external data, and the construction of a good prior estimate is crucial.  This, however, 
presents a formidable challenge due to the complexity and multitude of confounding 
factors that make the “black box” comparison of catastrophic events all but impossible.  
Samandar Roshan-Zamir (Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC)) used this 
approach by constructing a prior estimate based on civil transport aircraft data.  The 
results do not inspire high confidence, as they provide prior failure rates that are almost 
two magnitudes lower than the Shuttle-specific data.  It is reasonable to suggest that rates, 
if anything, could be higher (due to less-strict aircraft maintenance practices and the 
harsher environment seen by aircraft wiring).  This Bayesian approach was abandoned in 
a recent SAIC updated report in lieu of the observed reliability approach described in 
item 2 above.  The final estimate of wire-to-wire “smart” short probability was 9.8 x 10-6.   
The intensive wiring inspection performed after STS-93 corrected many wiring defects and 
instituted a rigorous plan for inspection, technician training, and wire damage awareness.  All 
accessible wiring gets external visual and tactile inspection (Category 2) during Orbiter Major 
Maintenance (OMM). 
To provide abrasion protection for the wiring, the pan head offset cruciform screws near the 
harnesses are being replaced with socket-head cap screws.  Teflon tape was applied to the wire 
bundles at the RJD connector backshell tang area.  Teflon tape wrap and convolute were added 
to the harness bundles at high abrasion areas as well as adding Teflon sheet and silicone rubber 
edging to protect wire bundles at chafe points.  
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Ground processing tests were used as screens for wire damage (e.g., insulation resistance and Hi-
Pot for repaired wire/connectors, functional checkout of wire/connectors before every vehicle 
flight). 
7.2.2  Darlington Pair Risk Mitigation 
Hazard Report (HR) ORBI-055, Rationale for Acceptance of Darlington risk, was evaluated as a 
part of the NESC ITA/I.  The HR notes that the RJD transistors are adequately de-rated for both 
current and voltage and exceed the Orbiter Project Parts List (OPPL) requirements of MF0004-
400.  The RJD assemblies are qualification (vibration, shock, and temperature) and acceptance-
tested (thermal and vibration) to certify the design and to meet operational performance 
requirements.  The RJDs are certified for a life of 10,000 hours, which the HR equates to 100 
missions.  The RJD also incorporates a Built In Test Equipment (BITE) circuit to indicate jet 
command ON vs. OFF status.  Pre-launch procedures require the Launch Control Center (LCC) 
to monitor RJD driver power on event telemetry after driver power activation and to monitor jet 
chamber pressure for any indication of unwanted jet firings.  Integrated subsystem verifications 
are performed during ground turnaround maintenance to ensure proper commands (A & B from 
the MDM for RJD activation), logic, driver, and trickle current measurements.  Note that a 
shorted jet driver will cause the BITE output to assert a status telemetry point to the MDM.    
Samandar Roshan-Zamir (SAIC) used a PRISM® electronic parts reliability database to predict 
Darlington failure rates.  The final Darlington failure rate prediction based on this analysis was 
7.15 x 10-9.  
7.2.3  Pin-to-Pin Short Risk Mitigation 
Standard controls such as visual inspection of connector mating faces, verifying the plug 
coupling ring clicks into place, and electrical checkout are sufficient to mitigate these risks.  The 
design practice calls for pin-to-pin short hazard analysis on all Critical 1 functions and separation 
of command and power pins within a connector.  All connector mates are Shuttle Connector 
Analysis Network (SCAN) tracked, which means that all copper paths, including connector pins, 
are verified prior to the flight.  Bent pins would be detected by this test.  The connectors are 
capped during maintenance and inspected before mating.  Finally, a short via shield wire braid 
debris was considered remote due to the connector “cork and bottle” interfacial seal.  Refer to 
Figure 7.2.3-1. 
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Cork and bottle seal 
Figure 7.2.3-1.  Back Shell Short via Wire Braid Strand, Metal Chip Contamination 
Considered Remote Due to Connector “Cork and Bottle” Interfacial Seal 
7.3  NESC PRA Evaluation  
7.3.1  NESC Evaluation of Ames Wire-to-Wire Short PRA 
A system level approach was used in the Ames PRA with a Fault Tree (FT) constructed to 
evaluate the influence of several failure modes.  While the study was quite detailed, only a few 
key assumptions were identified that could be sufficient for obtaining the final numerical results.  
Namely, wire chafing and carbonization of wires via arc tracking were major contributors to the 
FT top event, where the top event number was proportional to the number of significant wire 
damages found during the 1999 OV-102 wire inspections.  It was assumed that there was no 
damage on the initial wire installation, with linearly accumulated damage over 26 flights, and 
that the 1999 inspections detected and repaired 100% of significant wire damage.  No wire aging 
effects were factored into the analysis (i.e., a Homogeneous Poisson Process (HPP) was used).  It 
was also assumed that the combination of better inspections and less induced damage resulted in 
a 6-fold reduction of wire failures after 1999.  Timing of the wire short was not considered, even 
though only 9% of total powered time is during the docked window.  
 
Note, the Ames study was considered too conservative, which was the reason it was dismissed 
by the Shuttle Program.   However, some interesting features of this analysis can be examined: 
 
Initially, it was assumed that there was no damage to wires, and this damage uniformly 
accumulated during 26 flights.  This damage was then assumed to be 100% detected during the 
1999 inspection.  In addition to the issue of detectability, the model does not account for regular 
maintenance.  The difficulty with the approach is the need to reconcile the issues of repairable 
versus non-repairable systems.  A HPP is defined for repairable systems.  While HPP assumes 
that the rate of accumulated damage is constant and not the total amount of damage, in reality 
the former is proportional to the latter.  Applicability of a HPP implies that each occurring failure 
is repaired, and the system is restored to its original configuration, i.e., the old damage is 
removed.  With over 150 miles of wiring in the Shuttle, this is equivalent to stating that the 
overall state of the Shuttle wires neither degrades nor improves with time in any appreciable 
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manner.  The state of wires is measured by the frequency of occurrence of the wire damage (that 
is how many wires are damaged at any point in time).  
 
There were no distinctions made as to when during the turn-around cycle a failure occurs.  An 
assumption that the damage is permanent and immediately detected leads to a simple calculation 
of a correction factor by dividing the docking time by the total power-on time during one cycle. 
 
Finally, a post-1999 six-fold improvement in the rates of damage requires further justification, as 
existing data fails to support such an improvement.  Moreover, preliminary results from an 
independent NESC review and analysis of wiring damage data by Walter Thomas indicate that 
the no-aging assumption might be optimistic as well.  
 
Orbiter short circuit data (collected by P. Krause/Boeing) was analyzed by plotting “all 
interconnect” short circuit events and wiring short circuit events (a subset of all short circuit 
events) using the Crow-Army Material Systems Analysis Activity (Crow-AMSAA or CA) [7] 
model.  The time axis used was the “report date”, since no details about operating times at event 
occurrences were available.  This is not limiting, since degradation modes can operate exclusive 
of powered-on times.  The results are shown in Figure 7.3.1-1. 
 
 
Figure 7.3.1-1. Crow-AMSAA Plot of STS Orbiter Interconnect Short Circuits 
 
The Orbiter wiring short data indicate that wiring shorts may be worsening with time.  These 
data suggest that wire degradation does exist in the Orbiter.  More detailed analyses should be 
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performed to confirm details about failure modes and character.  Refer to Appendix G of this 
report. 
7.3.2  NESC Evaluation of SAIC’s PRA  
The PRA was generated by Samandar Roshan-Zamir (SAIC) around January 2004 and then 
updated in May 2004 with wire-to-wire “smart” short probability of 9.8 x 10-6 and Darlington 
failure of 7.15 x 10-9.   
 
Significant observations include: 
• The wire-to-wire short point estimate was based on two prior wire-to-wire shorts (STS-6 
humidity separator B in-flight failure and post STS-65 OMM failure of a caution and 
warning test). 
• The PRISM® electronic parts reliability database was used for Darlington failures.   
Using PRISM® and the MIL-HDBK-217 was outside the scope of the PRA.  They are 
meant to either be a design trade tool or to estimate warranty costs or service intervals— 
not an absolute source for field (in-service) failure predictions.  Tools such as these are 
intended for predicting average, rather than worst case behavior.  The issue is depicted in 
Figure 7.3.2-1 below. 
• The PRA for Darlingtons uses the “Reliability Analysis Center (RAC) Failure 
Mode/Mechanism Distributions, 1997” collector-to-emitter short only (<0.1%) while the 
same table shows a normal distribution of “shorted” as 30%.  Two of three short modes 
(collector-to-base, collector-to emitter) are catastrophic and typical of “shorted” 
condition.  This implies that the overall result should be at least x100 higher (more if 
aging is borne out by tests). 
• An earlier version (1991) of RAC “Failure Mode/Distribution Database” (FMD) shows 
“Transistor, Bipolar” and “Short” at 73%.  This is more applicable since these devices 
were manufactured in the pre-1990s timeframe.   
 
The issue of the detectability of wire-to-wire shorts (especially intermittent ones) remains an 
unknown, as it is recognized that all shorts reported in the Problem Resolution and Corrective 
Action (PRACA) database are due to the observed malfunctioning of some equipment.  It is 
reasonable to assume that some intermittent shorts went unnoticed.  However, future occurrences 
of the same shorts are capable of causing a catastrophic event. 
 
NESC notes that aging was not considered in the SAIC analysis.  Therefore, two failures do not 
provide enough information to support or reject any presence of aging.  It is important to 
recognize that the absence of aging is a non-conservative assumption.  
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Figure 7.3.2-1.  Typical Failure Distribution Functions 
 
• The study accounted for 4,000 feet of RJD control wire, but this is off by a factor of two 
since another 4,000 feet of wire was necessary to participate in smart short (i.e., 2 x (9.8 x 
10-6) = 1.96 x 10-5). 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Report 
Document #: 
RP-05-18 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Space Shuttle Orbiter Reaction Jet Driver (RJD) 
Independent Technical Assessment/Inspection Report 
Page #: 
19 of 155 
 
7.4  NESC Independent Evaluation Approach 
7.4.1  Wire-to-Wire “Smart” Short Evaluation Approach 
The NESC started the investigation into the potential of a wire-to-wire “smart” short in the 
Orbiter RJD polyimide wiring by examining the KSC failure reports that had been previously 
generated surrounding two relevant Orbiter wire damage incidents: STS-6 Humidity Separator B 
tripped 4 circuit breakers due to damaged wiring (OV-099) and the post STS-65 failure of a 
caution and warning test during OMM (OV-102).  Also reviewed were the post-STS-93 wiring 
tests performed at KSC, the “NASA Orbiter Sampling Test Results and Analysis” Wire 
Insulation Degradation Analysis System (WIDAS report, N224-RPT16SE0) [9], and the Boeing 
“New Wire Insulation Study for Potential Orbiter Use” [10], along with other documents. 
 
The NESC visited KSC to take a tour of the Endeavour (OV-105) during an OMM where a large 
portion of the Orbiter’s estimated 150 miles of wiring was exposed.  The team noticed that some 
Orbiter wiring had been insulated in Teflon convolute tubing and marked with yellow tags.  It 
was explained that these wire bundles had been identified as Criticality 1 functions and, 
therefore, a secondary insulation was placed around them to increase their resistance to 
mechanical damage and arc track resistance.  In the engine compartment area, there were 
articulating engine gimbals, hydraulic, ammonia, and hydrazine lines, and work platforms that 
were placed around large engine ducting.  There is a small concern regarding fluid leaks onto 
wiring that may cause a wire short condition.  The only fluid present that could rapidly degrade 
polyimide insulation during a flight is hydrazine.  Post-flight inspection is necessary to check for 
signs of a hydrazine leak.  A hydrazine leak would leave telltale signs on painted surfaces and 
other materials.   
 
A very high percentage of Endeavour’s Orbiter wiring received a Category 2 inspection and wire 
protection modifications.  Because of the density of wiring in some areas, it is very hard to 
inspect wires in the center or back side of bundles without stressing adjacent wiring.  Collateral 
damage of adjacent wiring is why the NESC is recommending abandoning the RJD wiring in 
place, and adding replacement wiring where space is available.  Statistical wire repair data has 
shown that not all wiring damage is found during inspection or testing, and that a second 
inspection will sometimes turn up damage that was originally missed.  This highlights the 
difficulty in 100% inspection, and promotes the desire to add fault tolerance to the RJD wiring 
subsystem.  Another concern was in the forward RCS thruster area, where thruster wire 
insulation showed signs of wear and tear including locations where the color topcoat was 
missing.  Overall, the condition of the wiring looked reasonably good for the age of the Orbiter 
and its environmental and maintenance exposure.  The team visited an area where electrical and 
mechanical technicians are trained in wiring awareness and repair.  This program was instituted 
after the STS-93 short and subsequent major Orbiter wiring repair effort.  Many hands-on wire 
harness training aids showing "how to" and "how not to" were present.  Refer to Appendix A for 
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examples of wire flaws that were presented during a Boeing course.  Also, in Appendix A, is a 
pros/cons chart of the various RJD risk mitigation options that were considered. 
 
During the initial phase of collecting data on the thruster wiring, there was some confusion on 
what type of wire was used from the RJD boxes to the thrusters.  First it was thought to be only 
single conductor wire.  Upon review of the Orbiter wiring schematics, the RJD wire was found to 
be a mixture of single conductor, twisted pair, twisted shielded pairs and unshielded twisted 
quads.  Also, the thruster wiring is routinely routed with power wires.  The wire configuration 
affects the susceptibility to a smart short or arc track event.  Two cable block diagrams 
highlighting a forward and aft thruster were generated to show the many wire configurations and 
bulkhead connectors along the path from the RJD boxes to the thrusters.  Also, two RJD thruster 
connector pinouts were diagrammed to show the proximity of power pins to RJD valve coil 
wires.  For the most part, signal separation guidelines are followed, but further investigation is 
needed on the remaining RJD thruster connectors.  A schematic of the RJD wiring configuration, 
shown in Figure 7.4.1-1, was developed by the NESC from the Orbiter wire database to facilitate 
analysis.   
 
 
Figure 7.4.1-1. Orbiter RJD Wiring Schematic 
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The susceptibility of polyimide wire to arc tracking and aging was investigated.  An arc track 
event can occur between a thruster command wire and an adjacent power wire through  
1. a wire-to-wire “smart” short;  
2. a power wire that arc tracks to structure and is in the same bundle with a RJD valve coil 
wire; or  
3. a power wire arc tracks to a return wire and is in the same bundle with a RJD valve coil 
wire.   
 
A wealth of information was gained from the post STS-93 wire testing program at KSC and from 
George Slenski's experience with aircraft wiring problems.  Dr. Terry St. Clair, an expert 
consultant in polyimide, was questioned regarding any aging mechanisms present in the 
polyimide film and possible test methods to determine degradation.  It was concluded that at the 
present time there is no definitive test available to determine aging effects in polyimide wire 
insulation.  As for arc tracking, it is a well established problem with polyimide wire insulation in 
certain wire configurations.  Polyimide wire was originally selected for its excellent dielectric 
withstanding voltage, cut-through resistance, and light weight.  After the STS-93 incident, the 
Orbiter Project performed extensive research to find a new wire replacement for the polyimide 
wire.  The conclusion was that polyimide was still the best choice for the Orbiter.  The Orbiter 
Project has protected some Crit 1 functions with Teflon convolute tubing, but the RJD thruster 
wiring has not been protected in this manner. The NESC proposed wire testing including one to 
determine the effectiveness of various wire configurations and secondary insulation protections 
against an arc track event. 
 
In conclusion, it is the NESC team's recommendation to replace the RJD thruster wiring with 
new polyimide wiring in a configuration determined by the proposed wire testing 
recommendations.  The existing RJD thruster wiring would be abandoned-in-place to minimize 
damage to the adjacent wiring. 
7.4.2  Darlington Transistor Evaluation Approach 
7.4.2.1  Analyses 
PSPICE modeling of the electrical circuits (typical example shown in Figure 7.4.2.1-1) was used 
to quantify the circuit parameters of assumed failure modes.  Review of WSTF test data 
indicated that the minimum energy necessary to activate both the fuel and oxidizer thruster 
valves is 12 VDC at 1A.  This was the threshold used in the circuit analysis to determine a jet 
fire/no-fire outcome.  In general, the RJD circuit is a robust design concerning the risk of 
inadvertent thruster firing.  The designers did an excellent job isolating power sources from the 
critical circuit areas, thus lowering the risk of inadvertent firing due to circuit failures.  This is 
considered an extremely important point if a redesign is considered for the STS or the next 
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generation vehicle.  There were numerous model simulation runs (~85) that are not included in 
the official report since the assumed failure modes were proven to be unrealistic or of no 
consequence to an inadvertent thruster firing.  The following summary will concentrate on the 
most probable assumed failure modes. 
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Figure 7.4.2.1-1.  Example of PSPICE RJD Drive Circuit Simulation Model 
 
A transistor pair configured as a Darlington Pair controls the thruster activation.  For this 
discussion, the input transistor (2N5682) will be called Q1 and the output transistor (2N5038) 
will be called Q2.  The key to reducing potential failure modes is to isolate all energy sources 
away from the base of Q1.  There are four entry points into the driver circuit plus the single 
output thruster drive signal.  The four are: the “transformer isolated” command input, the MDM 
telemetry output, a test point (J2-1 TP1) and the 28 VDC power connected to the collector of the 
Darlington pair.  All four of the entry points were investigated as a potential source of energy 
into the circuit that may cause an inadvertent thruster firing.   
 
The test point was eliminated as a potential energy source after the complete drawing package 
was received.  “J2-1 TP1” actually exists on the printed circuit card on a connector. However, 
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this connector is internal to the assembly and can only be accessed by removing a cover.  Thus, 
this test point was eliminated as a potential failure mode. 
 
The MDM telemetry point connects to the output thruster drive signal through a 12kΩ resistor. 
Due to this isolation resistor, no realistic MDM circuit failure could deliver sufficient energy to 
activate the thruster; hence, this input was eliminated as a potential failure mode. 
 
The RJD assembly receives activation commands over several control signals that drive the 
primary side of a transformer.  The secondary side of the transformer is connected directly to the 
base of Q1.  One potential failure mode would be a primary-to-secondary transformer short that 
would allow a control signal to connect directly into the base of Q1.  The modeling indicated that 
if this short were to occur, the result would be a partial activation of the Darlington Pair.  The 
maximum thruster valve current would be approximately 50mA and, therefore, insufficient 
energy to activate the thruster valve.  This scenario was eliminated as a potential failure mode. 
 
The 28 VDC power connects directly to the collectors of Q1 and Q2; there are no other circuit 
elements or potential current paths.  Therefore, all potential failure modes involve a current path 
inside either transistor package from the collector to the base.   The modeling assumed a 
collector to base resistive path and that the transistors were otherwise operating nominally.  
Additionally, to determine the threshold leakage current of one transistor, the other transistor 
leakage current was set to zero.  In reality, the leakage current will be additive and thus the 
individual minimum shorting resistance may be slightly higher.  For Q1, a resistive short 
between the collector and the base of less than 7kΩ will activate the switch.  For Q2, a resistive 
short between the collector and the base of less than 400Ω will activate the switch.  Thus, it does 
not require a hard short to activate the switch and provide sufficient current to fire the thruster. 
 
Failure modes for the Darlington transistors that could potentially cause thruster firing identified 
by the NESC are shown in Figure 7.4.2.1-2. 
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Figure 7.4.2.1-2.  Darlington Transistor Failure Mode Tree 
 
One other feature of the present design is that analysis shows that the Darlington transistor can 
be damaged by external overloads that increase leakage current or cause a short circuit without 
opening the fuse in series with it.  A comparison of the transistor safe operating area and the fuse 
characteristic is shown in Figure 7.4.2.1-3 illustrating this concern. 
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From On Semiconductor Data Sheet for 2N5038
.018 to 3.0 Seconds16.0 Amps
.002 to .015 Seconds45.0 Amps
.00010 to .00020 Seconds140.0 Amps
ME451-0010-1070 Fuse Specification (7 A Bussman)
Notes:
1) Red circle on chart is approximate 
fuse open characteristic for a 300 usec
short circuit
2) Transistor drive current may limit short 
circuit current to a lower value causing 
transistor short but impeding fuse open
See Note 1 
 
Figure 7.4.2.1-3. Comparison of Transistor Safe Operating Area and Fuse Characteristic 
7.4.2.2   Pre-Flight Leakage Current Testing 
Since it does not require a hard short of the Darlington transistors to fire the thrusters, the NESC 
has studied and recommended leakage current testing to measure all Darlington pair leakage 
currents and to verify that they fall within an acceptable distribution.  Any Darlington pair 
measurement that is not “in-family” should be investigated to determine the cause.  The data can 
also be used to trend an individual Darlington pair’s leakage current throughout its lifetime. 
 
This test has the potential to detect seven of nine identified potential failure modes as follows:   
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1. internal contamination;  
2. cracked die;  
3. damaged hermetic seal;  
4. electrostatic discharge (ESD) damage;  
5. current surge;  
6. voltage spike; or  
7. over temperature latent damage.   
 
It will not identify these potential failure modes: undetected conductive particles inside the 
transistor package (i.e., Particle Impact Noise Detection Test (PIND) escapes several instances of 
which have been documented in the Government/Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) as 
having caused failures on other programs and insufficient bond wire loft). 
 
The exact leakage current and expected distribution of this parameter to the transistor population 
has not been calculated.  However, it should be in the tens of micro-amp range up to milliamp 
range prior to the final failure.  The procedure would be to power on the RJD, but not to 
command the thrusters to fire.  The test would measure voltage across a known resistance to 
infer the leakage current.  The measurement can be made at three locations: the RJD interface, 
the MDM interface, or the closest available connector to the actual valves.  Each location has 
advantages and disadvantages, which are described in Figure 7.4.2.2-1. 
 
  
Reaction
Jet
Driver
Fuel &
Oxidizer
Valves
MDM
Interface
Drive Signals
Measurements here have the advantage of 
capturing a potential small class of wire problems.  
Replacing the valve resistance with a known 
higher resistance would eliminate the inadvertent 
thruster firing risk and provide a higher resolution 
signal.
Voltage measurements in the actual flight configuration are 
limited in resolution by the low impedance of the valves, 11Ω.
The same signal (in series with 
13kΩ) is available on the MDM 
Interface connector.  
Figure 7.4.2.2-1.  Leakage Current Measurement Location Options 
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The optimal test configuration would be to measure the voltage across a known resistance to 
infer the leakage current since generally voltage measurements are far easier to accomplish than 
current measurements.  The measurement resolution is determined by (and directly proportional 
to) the Darlington pair load impedance.  Impedance can be selected to provide the desired 
leakage current measurement resolution.  Since the circuit is essentially a current source, one 
would expect a low-level DC voltage.  Any AC characteristics observed during this measurement 
would be of interest. 
 
Assuming a measurement resolution of 1 mV and a load resistance of 11Ω, then the leakage 
current resolution would be ~90µA.  If the coil was replaced by a 10kΩ load, then the leakage 
current resolution would be ~0.1µA.   
 
 
 
           I(Lcoil)
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IB(Q1)
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100uA
200uA
300uA
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4.2.2-2.  Q1 leakage Current vs. Thruster Coil Current 
 
The plot shown in Figure 7.4.2.2-2 indicates the relationship between a potential Q1 (driver 
transistor) base leakage current and the thruster current.  Leakage current from Q2 (output 
transistor) would have a similar effect only at a different magnitude.  The actual box-level 
measurement will include the base leakage current of Q1 (multiplied by the gain of Q2) plus the 
base leakage current of Q2. 
 
In summary, this test has the capability to characterize the RJD Darlington pair leakage current 
for comparison of unit-to-unit as well as one unit over time.  A damaged unit will be identified 
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by “out of family” signature prior to a hard failure.  Seven of the nine potential Darlington pair 
failure modes will have a signature of increased leakage current.  There is flexibility in the test 
method and configuration to find that optimal point of maximum knowledge gained at the 
minimal test-induced risk.  Investigation of “out-of-family” units may provide information on 
currently unidentified failure modes.  Finally, the knowledge regarding a potential RJD failure 
mode changes from a binary state (pass/fail) to an analog level indicating the degree of damage 
to a unit. 
7.4.2.3  Destructive Physical Analysis 
The NESC recommends inspections, electrical tests, and DPA of representative samples of the 
flight Darlington transistors to characterize them and to determine if signs of part deterioration 
due to aging effects and/or manufacturing defects are present.  A second group of parts will also 
be characterized with regard to electrical overload performance and ESD sensitivity.  A test plan 
is included in Volume II, Appendix D, of this report.  
 
7.4.2.4  Data Search 
A search of data on the Darlington transistors has shown that a number of GIDEP alerts exist on 
some of the manufacturers of these parts types in a number of lot date codes.  Flight hardware lot 
date codes are being researched and data received to date has not shown direct coincidence.  
PRACA records have also been researched for the RJDs and cases of ground test units having 
transistor high leakage failures caused by external mis-wiring have been recorded at the White 
Sands Test Facility (WTSF).  This demonstrates that the RJD can be damaged by external faults. 
7.5  NESC Independent PRA 
The PRA was generated by Vitali Volovoi (Georgia Tech Research Engineer [6]) with wire-to-
wire “smart” short probability for OV-103 of 1.5 x 10-4 per flight or ~4 x 10-3 for 28 flights and 
Darlington failure at 1.18 x 10-5 per flight or 3 x 10-4 for 28 flights.  Refer to Appendix C of this 
report.  Aerospace Corporation was tasked by NESC to develop independent probability 
estimates for the Darlington transistors, using MIL-HDBK-217C and -217F with the same 
assumptions used by SAIC, and concluded the failure probability to be 1.9 x 10-6.   Their report 
is included as Appendix F of this report. 
The NESC independent assessment considered that the wire-to-wire “smart” short probability 
had a high uncertainty because of the need for refined data mining including unknown aging 
factors and the level of induced maintenance damage.  The Darlington failure probability 
assumptions were considered neither conservative nor optimistic; aging effects were not 
incorporated.  A known limitation of Darlington failure prediction was based on the PRISM® 
and MIL-HDBK-217 approach (MIL-HDBK-217 is meant to be a design trade tool, not an 
absolute source for field or in-service failure predictions). 
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A dynamic system level approach was used for the NESC PRA, refining the Ames’ PRA.  It 
incorporated model elements for evolution of wire damage (including aging) over OV-103’s 
lifetime, the causes of initial damage, the effects of routine and major maintenance, and post 
1999 improvements.  Unlike the Ames’ PRA, only failures occurring during docked operations 
are considered.  This dynamic model takes appropriate credit for the proposed use of BITE check 
on-orbit and the 5-hour RJD powered-on docked window for Darlington failure.  
 
7.5.1  RJD Wire-To-Wire “Smart” Short Failure Mode 
1. Using the Program’s 4 x 3 Risk Matrix (shown in Figure 6.2-1), the wire-to-wire “smart” 
short PRA likelihood computed by the NESC is infrequent (~4 x 10-3 for 28 flights or 1.5 
x 10-4 per flight). The consequence is catastrophic.  See Figure 7.5.1-1. Note that this 
numeric result is essentially the same as the least favorable result that the Program had 
initially considered. 
2. NESC’s wire PRA number has high uncertainty because the effects of wire aging and the 
level of maintenance-induced wire damage presently are unknown.   
3. Additional contributors to the NESC PRA uncertainty were the possibility of latent 
undetected damage, consideration that maintenance-induced damage may have a high 
likelihood of physical co-alignment amongst conductors, and the possibility of arc 
tracking effects spreading current within a bundle.   
4. High variability in the various RJD wire PRAs calls into question using these calculated 
probabilities as justification for flight rationale. 
5. A large exposure window of vulnerability to an inadvertent firing from this failure mode 
exists for the flight crew (175 hours/mission) and ground personnel (70% of turnaround 
processing). 
6. Given PRA uncertainties, unknown susceptibility of RJD wire to arc tracking, and the 
large exposure window, options to mitigate risk are performing 100% wire inspection or 
wire modification.  NESC recommended implementing a RJD wire modification before 
STS-115/12A. 
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Assumptions: 
• 175-hour docked exposure risk per flight 
• 1700-hours powered-on exposure risk per vehicle 
turnaround (except Ames who used frequency of wire 
damage occurrence) 
• 4,000 feet of the 150 miles of Orbiter wiring is RJD 
valve coil wire 
• No aging effects 
• Only identified (i.e. known) failure modes
Probable
Infrequent
Remote
Improbable
Marginal Critical Catastrophic
Controlled
Risk
Accepted
Risk
Unacceptable
Risk
Ames using PRACA data and assumptions 
(K. Datta, 10/29/03, 3.9E-3)
SAIC et. al. for PRCB using statistical methods w/ 
ground maintenance experience
(5/26/04, 2.5E-4)
SAIC using Bayesian methods and FAA data
(1/9/04, 3.9E-5)
NESC using dynamic wire 
model, Ames and other data
(V. Volovoi, 8/19/04, 4.0E-3)
 
Figure 7.5.1-1. Wire-to-Wire “Smart” Short Aggregated Failure Probability for 28 Flights 
 
7.5.2  Darlington Pair Failure Mode 
1. Using the Program’s 4 x 3 Risk Matrix, the Darlington PRA likelihood is infrequent (~3 x 
10-4 for 28 flights or 1.18 X 10-5 per flight). The consequence is catastrophic.  Note that this 
numeric result is approximately three orders of magnitude less favorable than the Program’s 
estimate, and is very close to the Honeywell (RJD original equipment manufacturer) analysis 
(see Figure 7.5.2-1). 
2. The key difference between the NESC analysis and the SAIC analysis is the distribution of 
“shorted” failures as a percentage of failed devices.  The basic part Failure In Time (FIT) 
rates derived from different sources (AT&T Reliability Handbook and PRISM®) are 
comparable.   
3. There are known limitations with both the SSP and NESC Darlington PRAs (i.e., no aging 
was assumed and the use of PRISM® and MIL-HDBK-217 for in-service failure predictions 
is not recommended).  Darlington failure by analyses has estimates that vary by 
approximately three orders of magnitude over the life of the program as shown in Figure 
7.5.2-2. 
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4. DPA of Darlingtons can provide critical aging and manufacturing defect information which 
cannot be captured in a PRA estimate. 
5. The Master Verification Plan requires test of Criticality 1/1 (i.e., catastrophic/zero-fault-
tolerant) functions before every flight.  The RJD is currently addressed via BITE with a 
binary (0 or 1) result.  Adding a leakage current test of all Darlingtons before each flight 
would be a far superior health check, identifying outliers and establishing a baseline for each 
device that can then be trended over the life of the Orbiter.  
6. Because of PRA uncertainties and limitations, zero-fault-tolerance of the RJD circuit design, 
and the potential for undiscovered latent defects or unknown failure modes, the majority of 
the technical team and slightly more than one half of the NRB recommended redesign of the 
RJD box to be at least single-fault-tolerant against the dual fault tolerant requirement.  This 
can be accomplished by incorporating high-side and low-side switching.  The scope of such a 
change may possibly be limited to a redesign of the RJD heat sink assemblies and BITE 
circuit with the use of HEXFET switches, in lieu of bipolar power transistors, as the drive 
signals are transformer coupled.  Such a change would improve the fault tolerance of the RJD 
box driver switches by approximately a factor of 106 and make the design more consistent 
with normal practice for circuits of such criticality, the penalty being reduction of reliability 
for normal firing by a factor of two.  Note that the electronics are considered to be much 
more reliable than the valves, and that the probability of a failure to energize a thruster will 
be dominated by mechanical failure modes of the valve. 
 
Assumptions:
• Based on average, not worst-case, failure rates
• 5-hour risk exposure per flight
• No aging effects
• Only identified (i.e. known) failure modesFavorable D
PAs
Favorable Leakage Tests
U
ncertainty  B
and
Probable
Infrequent
Remote
Improbable
Marginal Critical Catastrophic
Controlled
Risk
Accepted
Risk
Unacceptable
Risk
Honeywell 217C, original analysis (4.8E-4)
Rockwell 217F (8.6E-6)
Honeywell 217D, second analysis (4.7E-7)
SAIC, using PRISM (2.0E-7)
NESC using AT&T failure rates (3.3E-4)
Favorable DPA Test Results
No Evidence of Aging  from In-Situ Testing
No Identification of Additional Failure Modes
Aerospace 217C (5.4E-5)
Upper Bound Based upon Flight History
     Assumptions:
113 Previous Flights
88 Devices per Flight
Betw. 150 and 170 Total ON Hours per Flight
       (incl. 18 hours ON time during gnd processing)
 
Figure 7.5.2-1. Darlington Transistor Aggregated Failure Probability for 28 Flights 
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Figure 7.5.2-2.  Darlington Transistor Failure Analysis History 
7.5.3 Recommendations on Improving NESC PRA Estimates for Wire-to-Wire 
The probability directly depends on the number of damaged wires 
ese 
1. A separate count for each Orbiter shuttle of the instances of relevant significant damage 
2. of whether a repaired/replaced wire was from the original installation or 
d be 
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“Smart” Short Failure Mode 
 of wire-to-wire “smart” shorts 
in an Orbiter at any given point in time.  A model for the evolution of this damage has been 
created, but the output of the model is dramatically affected by several input parameters.  Th
input parameters can be estimated with satisfying precision if the PRACA database allows 
retrieval of the following information: 
(damaged and exposed conductors) for each occurrence of both routine and major 
maintenance. 
An indication 
whether there was a prior history for this wire segment (if a prior history exists, it shoul
readily available). 
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3. An indication whether neighboring wires are damaged as well (and whether there was an 
apparent common cause or not). 
4. Classification of these instances should be assigned with respect to the likely cause of this 
damage. While a detailed categorization is very desirable, at the minimum, the following 
categories should be provided:   
a. Initial defects: Defects that existed since the original installation. This category 
should not include installation errors that have led to subsequent wire damage; 
b. Improper installation: The wire damage is traceable to installation errors that created 
abnormally adverse conditions for the wiring; 
c. Maintenance-induced damage; and 
d. All other causes (vibration, aging, etc.). 
5. Indication of whether the wire is easily accessible for inspection and for other maintenance 
traffic. 
In addition to PRACA’s reporting of aspects of the wire damage, quantifying the reliability of 
visual wire inspection processes (probability of detection) would better estimate the total number 
of significant damage instances.   
New methods may be able to better detect damage, and this could dramatically alter the PRA 
estimates.  Serious consideration should be given to the feasibility of installing sensors (chemical 
or acoustic sensors) capable of detecting the occurrence of wire shorts (including intermittent 
ones).  This would greatly improve confidence in the observed frequency of shorts.  Also, 
continue to search for a credible test method to assess wire age degradation for input into wire 
evolution model.   
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8.0  FINDINGS, OBSERVATIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1  Findings from KSC Site Inspection  
The following concerns arose during KSC’s site visit of the OV-105, Hypergolic Maintenance 
Facility, and NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot (NSLD): 
 
F-1. A number of small diameter Orbiter cables with unsupported lengths of 12-16 inches 
were found (Figure 8.1-1). Boeing Desk Instruction specifies distance from connector to 
first clamp is 6" to 12" and the distance from clamp to clamp is as follows: 
 
Harness Diameter         Clamp Distance  
1/8" to 7/16"      6" to 8"  
1/2" to 11/16"    8" to 12"  
3/4" to 1-1/2"    15" max  
Greater than 1-1/2"      Special evaluation  
 
Unsupported cable  
Sharp 
Bend Radius 
Aft bay  
Fwd Reaction Control System (RCS) 
Pod Heater 
 
Figure 8.1-1.  Orbiter Cables with Unsupported Lengths 
 
F-2. Several cases where wire was bent to tighter bend radius than specification allows. 
 Note: Boeing spec ML0303-0014, page 16, paragraph 3.5.6, [8] allows 10 times the 
diameter of the largest overall wire or cable within the bundle with an 
exception, if the 10 times cannot be met, 4 times is allowed provided the cable 
is supported within 4 inches of the termination. 
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F-3. Unprotected wire bundles resting on bracket edges in upper equipment wiring area 
violates NSTS 8080-1 Std. 142, p. 3-285. 
F-4. Teflon-insulated wires contacting sharp corners within the RJD box violates the NSTS 
8080-1 Std., 142, p. 3-285 (Figure 8.1-2). 
 
Teflon wire on sharp corners
RJD Box Connector Area 
 
Figure 8.1-2.   Teflon-insulated wires contacting sharp corners within the RJD box 
 
F-5. Temporary Lexan wire protection covers charged enough to raise hairs - electrostatic 
discharge (ESD) concern (reference ESD requirement NSTS 07700 Volume X - Book 1 
(change number 303 dated 6-23-04), pages 3-261 through 3-262A). 
F-6. Darlington health requires integrity of the redundant back electromotive force (EMF) 
suppression network residing at each thruster valve.  Proper functionality of EMF 
suppression is verified every 4-7 flights during WSTF depot thruster testing, but not 
verified flight to flight.  Master Verification Plan (NSTS 07700-10-MVP-01, rev. D, 
paragraph 3.7.3, p. 7) requires all Crit 1/1 functions to be verified before every flight 
unless the test is considered to be invasive or illogical. 
8.2  Observations  
O-1. No occurrence of an inadvertent thruster firing has been observed in flight history and the 
present process of flight data review has not surfaced signs of impending failure/fault 
(although chance for a telemetry “escape” exists). 
O-2. The current RJD circuit violates fail ops/fail safe (two fault tolerant) requirement for Crit 
1 avionics function in 38 driver circuits. 
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O-3. Wire short failures from latent causes typically occur suddenly without prior warning.  
STS-93 wire short may have flown without incident for 11 flights (5 years) based on 
post-flight analysis of oxidation layer on conductor. 
O-4. NESC analysis of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) data shows that aircraft wiring 
flaws/failures have an aging component not considered in the existing predictions/risk 
calculations.  
O-5. The Program has had conductive particle and corrosion problems in EEE parts similar to 
the Darlingtons that have caused in flight anomalies (i.e., STS-58).  Many industry 
GIDEP alerts for transistors similar to RJD Darlingtons involve failure of PIND tests to 
screen for conductive contaminants. 
O-6. During a spot audit of the RJD connector layouts, the 50P9967 connector pinning had an 
RJD command pin next to an Orbital Maneuvering Engine command pin.  For an 
illustration, refer to Volume II, Appendix B of this report. 
O-7. A typical RJD box-to-valve solenoid wiring harness is a combination of 20 American 
Wire Gage (AWG) single conductors, twisted-shielded pairs, and unshielded twisted 
quads.  While shielded twisted pairs are more immune to induced damage and electrical 
noise, twisted pairs/quads are more prone to shorting and sustaining an arc track event.   
O-8. The RJD box-to-valve solenoid harnesses also include 28 VDC heater circuit wiring.  
Twisting and shielding of heater circuit wiring enhances arc track susceptibility and 
propagation to adjacent valve solenoid coil wires.  
O-9. There currently is no definitive chemical, mechanical, or electrical testing that can 
determine if polyimide wire insulation has degraded or “aged”.  
O-10. Using identical assumptions, the proposed high-side/low-side switching (single-fault-
tolerant) design would be ~106 times less susceptible to inadvertent firing than the current 
zero-fault-tolerant design.  As a result, the single-fault-tolerant design would be 2 times 
less likely to fire when needed.  
O-11. All PRA predictions are based on per-flight risk.  Using the small number approximation, 
risk will accumulate linearly with the number of flights (i.e., N times more likely to occur 
at least once during N flight regime). 
O-12. Insufficient information was provided on Darlington pair screening details.  HR ORBI 
055 cites OPPL requirements, but NESC-requested specifics for screening tests have not 
been provided. 
O-13. PRACA and Corrective Action Record (CAR) searches found 58 separate RJD 
documents (with 8 pre-STS-01 events) including blown fuses traced to ground support 
equipment (GSE), failed leakage/trickle current tests, and other OMS simulator or ground 
handling-induced problems.  Note that the Darlington transistors were replaced when 
fuses were found blown.  
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Conclusions from the PRACA search were that there were no RJD “stuck-ON” failures 
when connected to live thrusters; other RJD components could have been degraded by 
external stresses experienced during these ground events; the RJD is susceptible to 
damage by external events; and mapping of these 58 events by RJD S/N excluded the 
currently-installed RJDs and 4 of 6 flight spare RJDs from this concern. 
O-14. HR ORBI 055 (rev. E) and Failure Mode and Effects/CIL (FMEA/CIL) 05-1-F-FC6242 
& 05-1-FC6342 do not adequately address the effects of RJD part aging.  Reports state 
that RJDs are certified for 10,000 hours or 100 missions, equivalent to 10 years, but the 
actual physical age of some parts is much greater (e.g., 25 years). 
O-15. Six (6) GIDEP alerts exist on Darlington pair transistor types of similar age and make. 
(Note: Screening to exclude all Shuttle parts from Alerts is in progress).  
O-16. During the KSC site visit, un-jacketed loose braid at the connector back shells (tag-ring) 
was observed in the Orbiter cabling. 
O-17. During the KSC site visit, un-encapsulated stainless steel braided hoses were observed in 
the wire harness area. 
 
8.3  Recommendations  
Note: The NESC did not review the manifold auto-close software modification as 
effective for the next two flights.  All references to actions required before 
STS-115/12A assume the Program will ensure that the software modification 
is in place and verified effective before STS-114.  
R-1. Review the build records to compare GIDEP alerts in the NESC report to Orbiter 
Darlington pairs.  Refer to Section 7.4.2.4. 
R-2. As soon as possible, but NLT STS-115/12A, conduct Darlington tests proposed by 
NESC.  Refer to Section 7.4.2.2, Section 7.4.2.3, and to Appendix D, Darlington 
Transistor Test Plan. 
R-3. As soon as possible, but NLT STS-115/12A, institute on-orbit crew procedure changes 
(minimize RJD powered on time while docked and check RJD BITE circuitry before RJD 
power on). 
R-4. As soon as possible, but NLT STS-115/12A, update program Darlington PRA 
considering NESC results and stated limitations.  PRA should not only address all 
credible failure modes identified by NESC, but also capture the accumulated risks over 
the life of the remaining flights. 
R-5. As soon as possible, but NLT STS-115/12A, modify the Operations and Maintenance 
Requirements and Specifications Document (OMRSD) to perform a Darlington transistor 
leakage current test for every vehicle turnaround.  If feasible, reassign RJD channel 
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monitor outputs at MDM from bi-level to analog channels to obtain greater leakage 
current data in-situ.  Consider using RJD channel leakage current data from NSLD 
operations to look for prior degradation trends.  
R-6. As soon as possible, but NLT STS-115/12A, verify all harness connectors from RJDs to 
valve solenoids adhere to the requirement to separate power and critical signal pins 
(reference NSTS 8080-1 Std. 32, p. 3-65). 
R-7. As soon as possible, but NLT STS-115/12A, replace the 76 RJD valve coil wires with 
more resilient and better-protected wiring. This could be Teflon tape or convolute tube 
over existing wires, or replacement with most resilient configuration from proposed 
NESC wire tests. 
R-8. Update the Program’s wire PRA considering NESC results and stated limitations as a 
way to introduce wire aging effects.  Refer to Section 7.3.1 and to Appendix G, Wiring 
Damage Analyses for STS OV-103. 
R-9. Conduct wire tests proposed by NESC.   Refer to Appendix E, RJD Shielded Wire Dry 
Arc-Track Test. 
R-10. Investigate ways to eliminate FOD concern with shield braid termination wires in 
connector backshell area (e.g., wrap with Teflon tape or add conformal coating, "baggie" 
connector body and exit wire during ground operations). 
R-11. Investigate use of inert gas wire dielectric testing for detecting insulation defects during 
OMM wiring inspection. 
R-12. Ensure effort is underway to update HR ORBI-055 and that it addresses additional failure 
modes in the NESC report.  
R-13. Review OMM ESD control procedures for violations of ESD protection outlined in 
NSTS 07700 Volume X - Book 1 (change number 303 dated 6-23-04), pages 3-261 
through 3-262A.  Investigate use of ESD “sniffers” at Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF). 
R-14. Review in-flight telemetry data to identify momentary primary RCS inadvertent firings 
that may have either escaped observation or were mischaracterized as invalid due to weak 
signal-to-noise.  Refer to Section 7.2.2. 
R-15. Program should review its use of MIL-HDBK-217 in PRAs considering the known 
limitations of this method as a field (in-service) failure prediction tool. 
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10.0  LIST OF ACRONYMS  
Acronym Definition 
A amps 
ARC Ames Research Center 
AWG American Wire Gage 
BITE Built In Test Equipment 
BN Bayesian Network (or BBN for Bayesian (belief) networks) 
CA Crow-Army Material Systems Analysis Activity 
CAR Corrective Action Record 
CDF Cumulative Density of Failure 
CFR Constant Failure Rate 
CIL Critical Items List  
DPA Destructive Physical Analysis 
EDS Energy Dissipation Spectroscopy 
EMF Electromotive Force 
ESD Electrostatic Discharge 
EVA Extravehicular Activity 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR Federal Air Regulation 
FIT Failure In Time 
FMD Failure Mode/Distribution Database 
FMEA Failure Mode & Effects Analysis 
FMECA Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis 
FOD Function Operational Design 
FT Fault Tree 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
GIDEP Government/Industry Data Exchange Program 
GPC  General Purpose Computer 
GRC Glenn Research Center 
GSE Ground Support Equipment 
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center 
HPP Homogeneous Poisson Process 
HR Hazard Report 
ISS International Space Station 
ITA/I Independent Technical Assessment/Inspection 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
KSC Kennedy Space Center 
kW Kilowatt 
LaRC Langley Research Center 
LCC Launch Control Center 
LRU Line Replaceable Unit or Logistical Replaceable Unit 
MDM Multiplexer/Demultiplexer 
MECO Main Engine Cutoff 
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Acronym Definition 
MOSFET Metal Oxide Semiconductor Field Effect Transistor 
MVP Master Verification Plan 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NESC NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NIA National Institute of Aerospace 
NLT No Later Than 
NRB NESC Review Board 
NSLD NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot 
NSTS National Space Transportation System 
OMM Orbiter Major Maintenance 
OMRSD Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document 
OMS Orbital Maneuvering System 
OPF Orbiter Processing Facility 
OPPL Orbiter Project Parts List 
OSC Orbital Sciences Corporation 
OV Orbiter Vehicle 
OWWG Orbiter Wire Working Group 
Pf Probability of Failure 
PIND Particle Induced Noise Detection 
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment or Analysis 
PRACA Problem Reporting and Correction Action 
PRCB  Program Requirements Control Board 
RAC Reliability Analysis Center 
RCS Reaction Control System 
RGA Residual Gas Analysis 
RJD Reaction Jet Driver 
S&MA Safety & Mission Assurance 
SAIC Science Applications International Corporation 
SCAN Shuttle Connector Analysis Network 
SD Significant Damage 
STS Space Transportation System 
USA United Space Alliance 
V Volts 
VDC Volts Direct Current 
W Watt 
WIDAS Wire Insulation Degradation Analysis System 
WPAFB Wright Patterson Air Force Base 
WSTF White Sands Test Facility 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Report 
Document #: 
RP-05-18 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Space Shuttle Orbiter Reaction Jet Driver (RJD) 
Independent Technical Assessment/Inspection Report 
Page #: 
42 of 155 
 
11.0  MINORITY REPORT (dissenting opinions) 
 
At the NESC Review Board held on August 17, 2004, intense discussions resulted in split 
positions for the recommended course of action to be forwarded by the NESC.  Five of the seven 
assessment team members recommended that the RJD high-side/low-side switch redesign 
commence immediately.  Slightly more than one half of the NESC Review Board agreed with 
this approach while the remainder wanted to pursue additional data through test and evaluation 
before delivering a recommendation on the RJD redesign.  The NESC Director’s decision was to 
go forward with the later recommendation.  
12.0  LESSONS LEARNED 
This issue surfaced after a review of all integrated hazards by the ISS was directed after the 
Columbia accident, and ISS withheld signature on the Non-Conformance Report forcing the 
system to respond.  The SSP Hazard Report with waiver rationale was last updated in 1999 and 
did not account for all failure modes. 
 
Whereas some of the transistors and wires in the Orbiter fleet are 25+ years old, no data exists on 
aging effects and no test is currently available to assess age degradation of the Shuttle’s Kapton® 
wiring.  The various PRAs performed by both the Shuttle Program and the NESC produced a 
wide range of results.  All transistor PRAs used MIL-HDBK-217 as an absolute source for field 
(in-service) failure prediction, despite the handbook’s known limitation as a design trade tool.  
 
Because of uncertainty in the various PRAs, the NESC recommended electrical characterization 
testing and a DPA of the RJD transistors from flight assets to determine the potential effects of 
aging and manufacturing defects.  The NESC also recommended adding a new preflight leakage 
current test to assess the health of the transistors and the replacement of RJD valve coil wires 
with new, better protected wiring that would be separated from power wires. 
 
Lesson:  Programs that share physical interfaces, and therefore risks, should ensure that 
responsibilities for integrated hazards are clearly defined and that the system requires periodic 
reviews of these hazard reports. 
 
Lesson:  The effects of aging, operation, and environmental exposure should be factored into the 
expected operational life of new vehicle designs.  Reliability prediction methods should include 
aging effects. 
 
Lesson:  MIL-HDBK-217 is not suited as an absolute quantitative tool to predict the likelihood 
of electronic part failures in space systems and does not consider parts aging or stresses 
accumulated during field use, leading to potential over-estimation of part reliability. 
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Appendix A 
 
RJD Illustrations 
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Source: Orbiter Wiring Discrepancy & Repair, Course Presentation, 4/21/00, Boeing 
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Consideration of Possible RJD Options 
 
Approach Options PROs CONs 
No Hardware 
Changes 
• Limit RJD on time 
• Check BITE prior to 
each power on 
• Review 1.5 second 
requirement 
- Susceptibility 
- Response time 
• Retains RJD box and wiring 
configuration that has not 
shown prior problems in 
flight 
• Requires waivers 
• Susceptible to identified failure 
modes 
• Remote but credible risks 
remain 
Wire Only 
Change 
• Shielded wire for RJD 
outputs 
• Provides increased 
protection for wire-to-wire 
“smart” shorts 
• Lowers risk to KSC ground 
ops personnel 
• Increases susceptibility for 
wire-to-ground shorts 
• Does not address Darlington 
shorts and may increase their 
likelihood 
• Wire & RJD Dual High 
Switches 
• Simple fix for identified most 
likely failure modes 
• Does not require return 
wiring changes 
• Slightly more complex  
• Slightly lower reliability for 
normal firing 
Wire & RJD 
Box Changes 
• Wire & RJD High & 
Low Switches 
• Robust circuit change that 
addresses identified failure 
modes plus others such as 
transistor short without fuse 
opening 
• Slightly more complex  
• Slightly lower reliability for 
normal firing 
• Requires return wiring changes
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From Observation O-6. 
 
Connector Pinout - RJDA1-to-Thruster Harness (+Y Thruster) 
 
Foreign object debris 
(FOD) 
Functions:  Fuel & Ox solenoid command power, heater power 
Location:  Aft Body/Doghouse 
Reference Designator:  50P9967   Type:  24-61 plug, (61) 20ga. Contacts 
Observations:  Most thruster coil pins are separated from 28 VDC pins.  Bent 
pins can only short or disable thruster except for noted pins below             
L OMS 
CONT V2 
PWR, 
FUSE 3A 
 
Fuel & Ox solenoid command power,
ten twisted-shielded pairs, 20AWG,
7A fuse.
Thruster, Keel, & OME heater power,
14 twisted-shielded pairs, 20AWG,
3A protection from 50P254
Not connected
Low current, indicators, etc.
Twisted-shielded pairs, 20AWG
Return (ground)
RCS and OMS 
command pins 
adjacent 
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Appendix B 
 
Consolidated Failure Mode Listing 
 
8/8/2004 Failure Modes Resulting in an Orbiter Reaction Control Jet Inadvertent Firing Rick Gilbrech 
 NESC Independent Technical Assessment 757-864-2400 
 Color coded mapping to FTA (Vitali)  
 not modeled   
 directly modeled   
 inferred   
 
Mode # Description Probability 
   
1 Erroneous output from multiplexer/demultiplexer (requires multiple simultaneous synchronous signals). Improbable 
2 Erroneous output from General Purpose Computer. Improbable 
3 
Pin-to-pin short (hot)  – RJD output command pin to command pin short resulting in two thrusters firing 
instead of selected thruster or RJD output command pin to power resulting in inadvertent thruster firing. Remote 
4 
Valve coil command wire short to 28VDC conductor due to undetected mechanical damage to bundle 
during maintenance or inspection (e.g. removal or work platform crushes bundle but can't be seen since 
platform required for inspection). Remote 
5 Valve coil command wire short to 28VDC conductor due to undetected manufacturing flaw in bundle. Remote 
6 Valve coil command wire short to 28VDC conductor due to in-flight mechanical damage to bundle.  Remote 
7 
Valve coil command wire short to 28VDC conductor due to solvent attack of wire bundle insulation.  
Solvents, Skydrol, NH4, all take weeks to months of exposure at elevated temps (>100-200C) to drop 
tensile a few %.  Only ammonium hydroxide (2d at RT) and sodium hydroxide 10% (5d at RT) are 
catastrophic.  Water for 28d at 135C loses 50% tensile. Improbable 
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8/8/2004 Failure Modes Resulting in an Orbiter Reaction Control Jet Inadvertent Firing Rick Gilbrech 
 NESC Independent Technical Assessment 757-864-2400 
 Color coded mapping to FTA (Vitali)  
 not modeled   
 directly modeled   
 inferred   
   
Mode # Description Probability 
   
8 
Valve coil command wire short to 28VDC conductor due to conductive liquid between conductors and 
cracked insulation.  Improbable 
9 Valve coil command wire short to 28VDC conductor due to metallic chip wedged in bundle.  Remote 
10 
Valve coil command wire short to 28VDC conductor due to shield braid wire foreign object debris 
(~36AWG strand) bridging between 28VDC and command line through ring-cracks in insulation.  Note:  
Braid foreign object debris would need to "float" over from nearby LRU that uses tag-ring back shell with 
shielded wire.   Improbable 
11 
Arc tracking in wire bundle 28VDC wire short to ground where bundle contains valve coil command wire 
and arc propagates current to the coil wire.  A typical RJD-to-thruster bundle (22P67 or 50P9967) has (4 
to 14) 28VDC wires shielded and unshielded, (12 to 16) return wires, and (8 to 10) command wires 
shielded and unshielded.    Remote 
12 
Low resistance shorts between RJD control wiring and any voltage sources capable of 12.5V or more 
and 1A or more, need to consider over voltage conditions and application of high voltage to electrical 
ground.  Remote 
13 
Wire insulation flaws due to aging cause valve coil command wire to contact 28VDC conductor in a 
bundle.  Remote 
14 
Motion of unsupported bundle span causes chafing and short of valve coil command wire to 28 volt 
conductor.  Remote 
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8/8/2004 Failure Modes Resulting in an Orbiter Reaction Control Jet Inadvertent Firing Rick Gilbrech 
 NESC Independent Technical Assessment 757-864-2400 
 Color coded mapping to FTA (Vitali)  
 not modeled   
 directly modeled   
 inferred   
   
Mode # Description Probability 
   
15 
Internal RJD box wire short of any driver or output Darlington transistor emitter or base lead wire to 
28VDC conductor or terminal.   Photos taken at KSC do show wires resting on metal chassis edges in 
connector area.  However, wire appears to be Teflon-coated.  Cold flow of insulation would most likely 
have occurred much earlier.  Low probability of failure (abrasion of wire insulation with chassis edges 
may be possible). Improbable 
16 
Excessive leakage current due to aging, degraded metallization, or leaky hermetic seal in a driver 
Darlington transistor.  Remote 
17 
RJD box internal wire short of any Darlington transistor emitter or base lead wire to 28 volt conductor or 
terminal.  Improbable 
18 
Shorted Darlington output transistor caused by turn on into an intermittent valve coil command wire short 
to chassis that shorts transistor but does not open 7A fuse (requires two simo conditions – thruster firing 
during intermittent short).   Remote 
19 
Collector to emitter short of Q2 of any output Darlington transistor of a resistance of less than 6Ω.  This 
short will result in greater than 1 of current available for both the oxidizer and fuel valves. Remote 
20 
Collector to base short of Q1 of any output Darlington transistor.  A short being defined as any 
resistance of less that 6kΩ.  This short will result in greater than 1A of current available for both the 
oxidizer and fuel valves. Remote 
21 
Collector to base short of Q2 of any output Darlington transistor.  A short being defined as any 
resistance of less that 500Ω.  This short will result in greater than 1 Amp of current available for both the 
oxidizer and fuel valves.  (This is the same case as a collector to emitter short of Q1). Remote 
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8/8/2004 Failure Modes Resulting in an Orbiter Reaction Control Jet Inadvertent Firing Rick Gilbrech 
 NESC Independent Technical Assessment 757-864-2400 
 Color coded mapping to FTA (Vitali)  
 not modeled   
 directly modeled   
 inferred   
   
Mode # Description Probability 
   
22 
Arc tracking in wire bundle 28VDC wire short to return wire where bundle contains valve coil command 
wire and arc propagates current to the coil wire.  A typical RJD-to-thruster bundle (22P67) has (4) 
28VDC wires, (12) return wires, and (8) command wires. Remote 
23 Internal conductive contaminant in any Darlington transistor.  Remote 
24 
External conductive contaminant between Darlington transistor case (at collector potential) and the base 
or emitter pin.  This is typically a small dimension and the use of heat sink insulating wafers as is done 
here can trap a conductive particle in this critical area that over time with vibration and materials 
properties changes such as slight shrinkage in vacuum can result in a short.  Because of the insulating 
wafer this area will be uncoated.   Possible, but not highly likely.  Have seen this failure mode occur from 
time to time. Improbable 
25 
Darlington failure precipitated by ESD event, either during vehicle servicing or an in-flight event.  Failure 
could be immediate (prompt) or can result from prior (latent) damage.  Remote 
26 
Ground fault of an unrelated wire or device with sufficient current to damage RJD (return wires or 
avionics components).  Improbable 
27 
Drive transistor base to emitter resistor open circuit.  PSPICE modeling on this looked okay, but we will 
also test at high temperature.  Generally, transistor leakage current increases with the resistor open.  
This would tend to partially turn the Darlington pair on.  Improbable 
28 Ground fault current casing damage to RJD Darlington transistors. Improbable 
29 Mechanical failure in thruster valve (fuel and ox valve failures required for firing).  Improbable 
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8/8/2004 Failure Modes Resulting in an Orbiter Reaction Control Jet Inadvertent Firing Rick Gilbrech 
 NESC Independent Technical Assessment 757-864-2400 
 Color coded mapping to FTA (Vitali)  
 not modeled   
 directly modeled   
 inferred   
   
Mode # Description Probability 
   
30 
Over temperature of RJD box due to heat loop failure.  Need to have power to box shut down in the 
event of over temperature to prevent possibility of uncommanded output.  (The RJD box would probably 
need to get hotter than 125C for this to be an issue, and hopefully limit checking would catch such an 
event if it were to occur much sooner and shut it down). Improbable 
31 
RJD LRU internal leakage current path that causes the Darlington transistor pair to turn on.  The 
leakage could be caused by:  Not Credible 
  
Degradation of the isolation transformer in the Darlington driver circuit due to material aging, 
contamination, or arcing.  Not credible.  PSPICE analysis has shown insufficient current with transformer 
short to activate valves.  
  
Internal leakage path across circuit board or wiring due to contamination or arc track.  Not credible.  No 
circuit board modes due to isolation transformer.  Arc track is not likely since there is no evidence of 
polyimide inside RJD box, and wires are Teflon insulated rather than Kapton.  
32 
Component or subsystem failure inside RJD box that imposes 28VDC or higher voltage on valve coil 
command wire (i.e., power supply failure, edge connector failure, hook-up wire failure, foreign object 
debris, logic board failure, or filter circuit failure).   Not credible since output line does not go to circuit 
board but directly to output connector.  No power supply interface, no edge connector, logic board, or 
filter circuit failure identified as credible.  Hook-up wire addressed in #15 above. Not Credible 
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8/8/2004 Failure Modes Resulting in an Orbiter Reaction Control Jet Inadvertent Firing Rick Gilbrech 
 NESC Independent Technical Assessment 757-864-2400 
 Color coded mapping to FTA (Vitali)  
 not modeled   
 directly modeled   
 inferred   
   
Mode # Description Probability 
   
33 
Any energy source inadvertently connected to the RJD signal “J2-1 TP1”.  This appears to be a test 
point connected via a 10kW resistor to the base of Q1.  This is a critical point sense it provides an 
energy path into the Darlington pair control signal.  This signal terminates at an internal box connector 
and is not exposed to the environment outside the box.  Due to the isolation, this was not considered a 
credible failure and the probability of failure was assumed to be zero. Not Credible 
34 
Any energy source inadvertently connected to “Jet 1X MDM Out” telemetry signal.  This signal is 
isolated from the valve control signal by 13kW, (12kW in series with a 1.2kW resistor.) A voltage source 
of +28VDC (or a current source of +1 Amp) connected to this signal will not activate a valve.  This mode 
was not considered a credible failure and the probability of failure was assumed to be zero. Not Credible 
35 
A short across the Control voltage isolation transformer from the input drive power to the output center 
tap or end tap.  Since the transformer is a quadrifilar wound transformer, the input and output 
transformer wires may be in contact.  A short of the transformer input drive power will result in less than 
50mA of valve drive current.  Since this in insufficient current to actuate the valves, this mode was not 
considered a credible failure and the probability of failure was assumed to be zero.   Not Credible 
36 
The thruster back EMF voltage coupling across the control isolation transformer and stressing the input 
drive power transistor.  Due to the quadrifilar wound transformer there will be substantial capacitance 
between the input and output wiring.  Assuming the worst-case capacitance of 12,000pF, there was 
insufficient voltage to be a concern to the drive power transistor.  This mode was not considered a 
credible failure and the probability of failure was assumed to be zero.   Not Credible 
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NESC Independent Technical Assessment 757-864
Color coded mapping to FTA (Vitali)  
not modeled   
directly modeled   
inferred   
  
Description Probability
  
37 
Electromagnetic energy coupling into the valve drive wire and inadvertently enabling the Darlington pair. 
Due to the transformer isolation of the Darlington Pair control voltage; it does not appear that a realistic 
energy source can couple sufficient energy to activate the valve.  This mode was not considered a 
credible failure and the probability of failure was assumed to be zero.  Not Credible 
 38 Cosmic rays deposit charge that can activate and/or short transistors. Remote 
 
 NOTE:  Likelihood based on NSTS 07700-10-MVP-01, rev. D   
 
Probable:  Will occur several times in the life of the program.  A general guideline for likelihood of 
occurrence would be 1 in 12 to 125 flights (8.3E-2 > X > 8E-3).  
 
Infrequent:  Likely to occur sometime in the life of the program.  A general guideline for likelihood of 
occurrence would be 1 in 125 to 1,250 flights (8E-3 > X > 8E-4).  
 
Remote: Unlikely, but possible to occur in the life of the program.  A general guideline for likelihood of 
occurrence would be 1 in 1,250 to 12,500 flights (8E-4 > X > 8E-5).  
 
Improbable: So unlikely that it can be assumed occurrence may not be experienced in the life of the 
program.  A general guideline for likelihood of occurrence would be greater than 1 in 12,500 flights (X < 
8E-5).  
  
 
8/8/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mode # 
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Appendix C 
 
 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Failures Leading to the Inadvertent Firing of 
Thrusters while the Orbiter is Docked to the International Space Station 
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Summary 
This document describes a quantitative model for assessing risks associated with the inadvertent firing of thrusters 
while an Orbiter is mated to the International Space Station (ISS). Wire-to-wire “smart” shorts as well as failures of 
the Darlington pair are considered. Since previous risk assessments of the same problem provided widely varying 
risk estimates, approaches and assumptions of these assessments are reviewed. Challenges of risk modeling in the 
context of NASA programs are also discussed. A dynamic model for the amount of wire damage as a function of 
time was developed to evaluate the probability of a wire-to-wire “smart” short. This model estimates the amount of 
significant wire damage for a given Orbiter and flight. The relevant significant damage for both wire-to-wire 
“smart” short and arcing is considered to be exposed and damaged conductors. Initially, the input parameters for this 
model were obtained using a combination of engineering judgment and a very limited amount of historical data. 
Consequently, a more detailed analysis of PRACA data has been conducted (see Appendix G) which provides 
alternative estimates for some of the critical input parameters into the wire damage model. The calculations from 
both approaches values of significant damage (SD) are used as inputs for fault trees to evaluate the probability of a 
wire-to-wire “smart” short. While the presence of significant wire damage is necessary for the short to occur, the 
damage might be dormant for several flights before the failure takes place. The possibility of the delay between the 
wire damage occurrence and the associated wire short is recognized by introduction of the so-called dynamic basic 
events. In calculating the probability of Darlington pair failure, the exposure rate is five hours for all 38 thrusters. 
Model for estimating likelihood of a wire-to-wire “smart” short is based on Orbiter-specific data (OV-103 wire 
damage data was used to construct the model). The model provides guidelines for collecting and processing relevant 
historical and experimental data to improve the confidence in predictive power of risk estimates. Strong coupling 
among the influences of input model parameters on the risk estimates leads to difficulties in conducting traditional 
sensitivity analysis. Due to the lack of data needed to characterize the input parameters probabilistically, interval-
based methods for uncertainty quantification might provide an attractive alternative for the follow-up studies. 
 
Outline 
The introduction consists of a general background on reliability and safety predictions for complex, unique systems 
such as those used by NASA. This is followed by a review of previous risk assessments of inadvertent firing of the 
Shuttle’s thruster, including the point estimate provided by Samandar Roshan-Zamir (SAIC) [ 1] and the risk 
assessment conducted by Koushik Datta (NASA Ames) [ 2]. The present assessment is focused on the two most 
credible failure modes: a wire-to-wire “smart” short and failures of a Darlington pair. While a fault tree (Figures C-8 
through C-14) is constructed that unites both of these modes, each of the two modes requires a fundamentally 
distinct approach, and the rest of this document treats them separately. There is a significant amount of information 
directly or indirectly related to wire-to-wire “smart” shorts and the main challenge is to process this information and 
assess its relevance. A motivation for the selected approach is provided followed by a construction of a wire damage 
model that reflects dynamic (time-dependent) characteristics. The output of this model is consequently utilized to 
calculate probabilities of several critical basic events in the fault tree. Table C-2 lists basic events for wire-to-wire 
“smart” short. In contrast to Table C-2, there is very little information available on the reliability of Darlington pairs, 
which makes the analysis relatively simple, but the predictions remain highly uncertain. Table C-3 lists events for 
the Darlington pair.  
 
Background 
As engineering systems became more complex during the second half of twentieth century, the need for 
comprehensive means to assess and predict their reliability and safety became evident. However, several significant 
obstacles hampered both the development of new methods and techniques addressing this need and their acceptance 
by the general engineering community. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) [ 3, 4]  was originally introduced in the 
context of nuclear plants and after the Challenger accident was recognized by NASA as the most appropriate 
framework for evaluating safety of a system [ 5].  It has been acknowledged that spacecraft systems and nuclear 
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plants share important characteristics that make the analysis of their safety sufficiently similar: both are complex and 
highly coupled systems which make them inherently prone to failure [ 6], while they are so unique and the potential 
accident consequences are so unacceptable that a direct inference from historical experience is not possible. Despite 
the declared allegiance to the use of PRA, from the practical perspective, NASA’s approach to safety remains 
strong. In accordance with PRA procedures, safety is measured by risk defined as a comprehensive set of accident 
scenarios along with their respective likelihoods and consequences. Two obvious challenges arise: to ensure that this 
scenario set is indeed comprehensive and to evaluate the likelihoods. The former challenge is certainly a daunting 
one, but apparently manageable by NASA quite successfully – the loss of both Orbiters is attributed to the failures 
whose possibility was conjectured beforehand. In contrast, the record of the Agency’s treatment of likelihood 
evaluation is somewhat more mixed. As argued in the context of the Challenger’s accident [ 7], NASA reliance on 
the critical item list (CIL) and associated disregard of the importance of likelihood has deep historical roots. The 
only way CIL accounts for different likelihoods of events is by differentiating the levels of redundancy. Obviously, 
this provides a very coarse resolution for addressing the likelihood, as a redundancy can be easily defeated if it 
involves events with a relatively high likelihood, while a single-point-failure can be extremely unlikely. While risk 
matrices are currently employed, their quantitative interpretation is far from straightforward. Furthermore, the 
meaning of likelihood in a risk matrix might be interpreted not in a probabilistic sense, but be related instead to the 
ease with which the accident scenario can be averted (i.e., mitigation options). The latter is obviously very important 
yet unrelated to the likelihood of occurrence. This reluctance to employ likelihood in decision-making process can 
be partially attributed to the uncertainty inherent in the probabilistic predictions: high sensitivity to “chance events” 
that provide external disturbances to the system necessitate statistical characterization, and this characterization is 
often based on a poor sampling base unless the relevant accidents occur frequently enough. This is counterintuitive 
to engineers’ mind set with its fundamental reliance on deterministic causality. Contrary to the traditional 
engineering experience, there is no immediate feedback provided by implementation – a well-designed system can 
fail due to unfortunate circumstances, while a serious design flaw may remain latent for a very long time.  
As a result, verifying the prediction can be extremely difficult.  A system pronounced safe by the analysis can fail 
due to:  
i. Statistical variation that complies with correctly predicted statistical characteristics of the system: “bad 
luck” corresponding to aleatory (irreducible) uncertainty. 
ii. Uncertainties in predicting statistical characteristics of the systems within a chosen predictive model (PRA 
aims at quantification of these uncertainties). 
iii. Incorrect modeling (“unknown unknowns”): missed failure modes, wrong assumptions, etc. 
It is important to distinguish among these three sources to facilitate a meaningful decision-making process, but this 
task if far from trivial. In accordance with PRA procedures written for NASA practitioners [ 5], an explicit 
probabilistic treatment of epistemic (i.e., caused by the lack of knowledge) uncertainty is recommended; this 
corresponds to the second source (ii) in the provided above classification. This implies the use of probabilistic 
distributions instead of point estimates for the statistical parameters of the relevance to the risk assessment events. 
However, no data might be available to infer the type and properties of these distributions, while the final results are 
usually extremely sensitive to this information. Often, only ranges of possible values for the parameters might be 
available (e.g., based on the expert opinion solicitation), but not the distribution within those ranges. To address this 
problem the use of so-called Generalized Information Theory (GIT) is advocated [ 8].  
Interval-based uncertainty modeling. GIT has received significant attention of researchers in recent years and it 
encompasses possibility theory, Demster-Shafer evidence theory, as well as fuzzy set theory. A comprehensive 
taxonomy of uncertainty modeling is provided in [ 9].Within the GIT framework, interval-based calculations are 
conducted to arrive at lower bound (referred to as belief and necessity in evidence and possibility theories, 
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respectively) and the upper bound (referred to as plausibility and possibility in evidence and possibility theories, 
respectively) of a risk measure as opposed to a traditional probability approach that provides a single estimate for 
this measure. Furthermore, a strict “all-or-nothing” membership of classical set theory can be relaxed by means of 
fuzzy sets [ 10], where for a set a continuous measure of the set membership Aµ  is 
introduced to reflect intermediate relationships (whereas only extreme values 0 and 1 are realized in classical set 
theory). For any value ]1,0[∈α  a so-called α-cut defined as  represents a classical 
(so-called “crisp” set) that corresponds to selecting α as a threshold for the inclusion into the set membership. By 
varying α one can form a nested family of sets  when
}) α≥(|{ µ∈≡ xXxA Aα
βα AA ⊆ βα > . Applying these concepts to risk 
assessment, one can consider a family of nested family of intervals that represent range of values supported by 
evidential data, where α-cuts generalize the classical notion of confidence intervals. 
XA ⊂ ]1,0[: →X
Risk Modeling.  For mass produced systems, such as cars or commercial airplanes, a direct operational experience 
usually provides sufficient statistics to significantly reduce the influence of both (ii) and (iii), thus facilitating 
construction of high-fidelity predictive models. On the other hand, for one-of-a-kind systems, distinct 
characterization of these sources of uncertainty presents formidable challenges. Two main approaches could be 
identified in addressing these challenges: holistic (unstructured) and system (structured or analytical) approaches. 
The former treats the system as a whole, while the latter relies on decomposing the catastrophic event into a set of 
more elementary events and conditions. Brief descriptions of each approach as well as their advantages and 
drawbacks are provided below: 
Unstructured approach (black box point of view): Assessing behavior of a system as a single entity provides 
obvious advantages of simplicity with only few parameters determining system safety. If the relevant data is 
available, quantifying risk and estimating parametric uncertainty (i.e., type ( ii)) is fairly straightforward. The 
simplest version of this approach corresponds to observed reliability [ 11] and is based solely on past experience of 
the system under consideration. Due to the scarcity of system-specific data, selecting events that are significantly 
similar to the studied catastrophic event presents the following dilemma: a relatively loose similarity selection 
criterion poses the problem of accounting for dissimilarity (such as between wire-to-wire “smart” short vs. wire-to-
ground shorts); on the other hand, a more strict similarity criterion leads to a small sampling pool, with resulting 
difficulties for any meaningful statistical inference. Effectively, resolving this dilemma requires a certain degree of 
event decomposition, but unlike the system approach described below, system approach this decomposition is 
conducted informally based on qualitative arguments. Even assuming that this separation of all historical data into 
relevant (i.e., sufficiently similar) and irrelevant sets is conducted superbly, in most of the practical cases the very 
need of providing a crisp threshold inevitably results in overestimating the relevance of included events (since they 
rarely are identical to the modeled accidental event) while discarding the information associated with the excluded 
events completely. Here it is appropriate to note that the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) has relied on this approach, 
and their selection of only two wire-to-wire “smart” shorts as relevant events provides a good example of the 
described problem. A more flexible treatment would allow for a continuous measure of relevance, e.g., varying from 
0 (totally irrelevant) to 1 (identical), with the contribution to the final analysis apportioned in accordance with this 
measure of relevance. If such a measure is provided, fuzzy set classification [ 10] provides natural means to account 
for it. The lack of system-specific data can be partially compensated by means of Bayesian analysis, which is 
discussed below. 
 
If a failure of a complex repairable system, such as the SSP, is considered without any formal event decomposition, 
then the stochastic point processes are usually used to describe the failure occurrences [ 12]. The most common 
model corresponds to a Homogeneous Poisson Process (HPP) that describes a situation where, upon failure, the 
system is immediately restored to as-good-as-new condition (perfect repair). Furthermore, each consecutive failure 
has the same statistical characteristics as the previous one, implying that the system neither deteriorates (ages) nor 
improves with time. Under this conditions the probability of occurrence of n failures in time segment [0,t] is 
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HPP can be considered as a natural generalizatio  to repairable systems of exponential (constant) failure rate used 
for non-repairable systems, as the time between any two consecutive failures follows the same exponential 
distribution. On the other hand, non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) can account for aging (which can be 
manifested in less-than-perfect repair). 
nn!
)exp()()(),( ttnXPtnp
n λλ −===  
System (analytic) approach (white box point of view): decomposing a complex event into a set of more 
elementary events and conditions is usually more involved when compared to the unstructured modeling, but the 
benefits can be enormous. The following main advantages can be identified: 
 
• A unique system is usually constructed of sub-system or components that are more standard, so their 
behavior can be better statistically characterized based on the previous experience from other systems. 
• The “fuzzy” issue of similarity of different complex events (see the discussion above) can be more easily 
quantified by representing them as chains of simple events and identifying shared links in those chains. For 
example, a chain of event leading to a wire-to-wire “smart” short can be meaningfully compared to a wire-
to-ground short by identifying additional conditions required for the former. 
• Testing at the subsystem or component level is easier to conduct and is usually more extensive than the 
system-level testing. This leads to inherently less reliable system-specific data for behavior of a system as 
a whole, as opposed to behavior of its parts. This trend becomes even more pronounced for very complex 
system: the SSP was the first American spacecraft that was not flight-tested as whole system [ 13]. 
• If the absence of “hard” data experts’ opinions on the likelihood of events can be solicited and relied upon. 
Experts’ estimates are prone to systematic and significant biases [ 14]. Event decomposition is recognized 
as one of the most effective methods to reduce this bias [ 15]. This is particularly true when dealing with 
rare events, as humans (including experts) have great difficulties in assessing very small probabilities. 
Elementary events are more likely to occur and therefore can be better estimated than a directly estimated 
complex event composed of a sequence of those elementary events. 
• PRA is only one of several factors used in a decision-making process. Another important factor is 
historical experience with the system. By using a holistic approach to PRA these two factors become 
highly correlated, effectively replicating one another. On the other hand, event decomposition leads to 
more independent results that often provide a usefully distinct perspective at the problem at hand. 
• Event decomposition aids identifying weak links in the design by providing consequent sensitivity studies 
which facilitates selection of effective mitigation options. 
 
By far the most common method of system failure analysis (and a cornerstone of PRA procedure) is Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA), which was introduced in the early 1960s [ 16, 17]. In standard form, FTA relies on two logical 
“gates” (“AND” and “OR”) to combine “basic events” (i.e., leaves of the tree) into the “top-level event” (root of the 
tree). This allows evaluating the probability of top-level event based on given probabilities for basic events. Figure 
C-2 depicts a simple fault tree with three basic events (denoted as circles) combined into a top-level event by means 
of a single “AND” gate (note the flat bottom of the symbol for the gate). Figure C-8 presents a more complex fault 
tree (a detailed description of this fault tree is provided in the later chapters of this Appendix), where the top-level 
event is an “OR” gate (thus a concave bottom of the corresponding symbol). In addition to the “AND” gate 
(WWSHORT), the fault tree contains so-called transfer gates (denoted in Figure C-8 as triangles, gates 
DARLINGTON and WWCONTACT). Transfer gates are purely a means to break a big tree into smaller ones that 
allow hierarchical representation of fault trees (e.g., gate DARLINGTON is expanded in Figure C-12, which 
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represents the fifth page of the fault tree: note the reference to that page underneath the gate symbol and gate 
WWCONTACT is similarly expanded in Figure C-9, which is the second page of the fault tree). The main 
advantage of FTA is its ability to focus on the top-level event of interest, rather than describe all possible states of 
the system. For example, the system modeled in Figure C-2 can have  possible distinct states if all three 
basic events can occur independently (each event either occurs or does not). However, in FTA probability of only 
one state is considered relevant and calculated (corresponding to all three basic events occurring simultaneously). 
On the other hand, state-space based methods such as Markov chains and Petri nets model all possible system states, 
which makes them susceptible to the so-called “space explosion” when the size of the model grows exponentially 
with the number of elementary events effectively precluding all but the smallest models (however, there is a way to 
circumvent this problem for Petri nets, as discussed below).  
823 =
 
One of the main disadvantages of the FTA stems from its reliance on independence among the basic events. 
Modeling-dependent events can be critical for understanding the system’s behavior in its own right, but the situation 
is further compounded by the binary nature of FTA as it complicates modeling a very common situation when there 
are more than two possible states. To illustrate this point, let us consider a simple situation where a transistor can be 
in one of three possible states:  operating, shorted, or opened. Let us assume that the short of this transistor can lead 
to a condition A, while the opening of the same transistor can lead to a condition B. Let us further assume that 
simultaneous occurrence of both A and B (represented by two branches connected by gate “AND”) leads to a 
catastrophic event C. Since this transistor cannot be both shorted and opened at the same time, C cannot occur solely 
due to the failure of this transistor, but it is hard to account for this using FTA. Obviously, if the transistor is the sole 
source of both events A and B, one could just eliminate the whole branch (which in practical situations can be not as 
trivial as it seems since FTA construction encourages step-by-step thinking). However, if either A or B can be 
caused by some other events, then the branch cannot be eliminated altogether and modeling using FTA would lead 
to completely erroneous results. 
 
As described in [ 5] (Section 6), fault trees also have limited capabilities in modeling complex dynamic scenarios 
where the timing of individual events is critical for evaluation of the probability of failure. A standard PRA practice 
[ 4] is to model temporal aspects of the failure scenarios using event trees, with fault trees used to model (static) 
logical inter-relationship for so-called pivotal events. However, the dynamic nature of the basic events for fault trees 
often needs to be modeled as well. While numerical values for basic events can be provided in terms of failure rates, 
those rates are consequently integrated over the duration of the mission (or the appropriate portion thereof) to yield 
the total probability of this event occurring during a given mission. Alternatively, the total probabilities for basic 
events are input directly. Regardless of how those total probabilities are obtained, they are combined using Boolean 
logic to render the probability of the top-level event. 
 
In contrast to FTA, Bayesian (belief) networks (BN or BBN) provide a very efficient means of modeling 
dependency and are extensively used in the context of artificial intelligence. Recently their application to system 
reliability started to attract serious attention as a possible and more flexible alternative to FTA [ 18]. Events in BBN 
are represented by nodes which are connected into a directed graph. The direction of each connection indicates a 
parent-child relationship (connection goes from a parent to a child). No cycles (loops) are allowed. Nodes without 
parents are referred to as root nodes (and their marginal probabilities are specified for each value at the node, the 
latter is not being limited to binary values). Conditional probabilities are specified for non-root nodes for each 
possible combination of its parent node values. Continuing with the transistor example, one can observe how the 
described above difficulty with the FTA is trivially resolved using BBN (see Figure C-1). 
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Figure C-1.  A Simple Bayesian Belief Network for a Transistor with Three Possible States 
Describing dependency in a local fashion allows avoiding a full description of the state space, and any FT model can 
be recast into a BBN. Additional features as compared to FTA include: 
• Multi-state variables  
• Sequentially dependent failures 
• Probabilistic (“noisy”) gates that provide a convenient means to model uncertainty: rather than stating 
that occurrence of events A and B will lead to event C (deterministic causality is expressed by standard 
“AND” gate), a noisy “AND” gate will specify the probability of C occurring conditioned on the 
occurrence (and, importantly, non-occurrence) of A and B  
• Meaningful measures of criticality for a root node (i.e., basic event) based on evaluating posterior 
probability of the node given the system failure (see the section of Bayesian Methods on Bayesian 
updating below) 
 
The role of BBN modeling in system reliability is likely to increase in the future. However, both FTA and BBN rely 
on static causality, which explains the absence of loops describing feedback mechanisms and limits their capabilities 
to model dynamic scenarios including repairs and system’s reconfiguration in response to changing circumstances 
(an increasingly important feature of complex systems).  In such situations, one has to resort to state-space based 
models that provide means to evaluate transitions among the system’s states. 
 
Markov chains are the simplest and most common state-space modeling technique with each possible system state 
denoted by a circle and directed arcs indicating transitions between states. These transitions are characterized by a 
single constant parameter corresponding to the transition rate (although multi-phase modeling is possible with the 
constants changing between phases). Figure C-3B shows a simple example of a Markov chain. Two important 
drawbacks of this technique can be identified: 
 
• State-space explosion: the size of Markov chain models grows exponentially with the number of 
components/events.  As a result, only a very small number of components/events can be modeled within a 
single model.  
• The constant transition rate reflects the so-called memory-less property of Markov models where the future 
depends only on the present (and not on the past) and corresponds to transitions occurring in accordance 
with exponential distribution. Modeling of systems that either age or improve with time requires 
introduction of auxiliary system states, thus further increasing the model size. 
 
Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN) provides an attractive alternative of Markov chains as they address both of these issues 
[ 19,  20]. Figure C-3C depicts SPN model for wire damage. Petri nets are directed graphs with two disjoint types of 
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nodes: places (denoted as circles) and transitions (denoted as rectangles). A directed arc connects a place to a 
transition (an input arc) or a transition to a place (an output arc). The places connected to a given transition by input 
or output arcs are called the input or output places, respectively, for this transition. Each place can be assigned a 
non-negative number of tokens (denoted as small circles). A combined token assignment for all the places in the 
model fully characterizes the system state, and is referred to as the model’s marking. Changes in the system state are 
reflected in token movements, which are in turn facilitated by the so-called “firing” of transitions.  For a transition to 
be fired it must be enabled for a specified amount of time. A transition can be enabled if all its input places have 
tokens. Other requirements that are functions of marking can be present as well. Transitions can be classified in 
accordance with the specification of the delay between enabling of a transition and its firing; such a delay can be 
absent (an immediate transition, denoted with a thin bar), deterministic, or sampled from a given distribution 
(stochastic). Timed transitions (both stochastically distributed and deterministic) are denoted with a solid rectangle. 
Upon firing, a transition removes a token from its input place and deposits a token to its output place. 
 
The following differences between Markov chains and SPN are noted:  
• In Markov chains each circle corresponds to the state of the system as a whole. Marking provides the same 
functionality for SPN, where each token location can correspond to a more elementary event (or component 
state). As a result the system state is implied in SPN which results in much more compact description of large 
systems, since there is no need to explicitly enumerate all the possible permutations of elementary states. 
Obviously, when only one token is used (as in Figure C-3C then its location denotes the system as a whole as 
in Markov chain). For example, one could refine the modeling by distinguishing two types of wires: those 
located in the high-traffic area (and therefore prone to induced failures, but also easily accessible) and those in 
the low-traffic area. Then each of these types can be represented by a token and the model would have two 
tokens instead of one without the need to explicitly extend the state-space (as required to represent the same 
model using Markov chains). 
• Transitions in SPNs are not limited by constant-rate assumption, so general distributions (such as Weibull or 
Lognornal) can be directly accommodated.  
 
Bayesian Methods  
 
With the availability of power computing resources, computationally-intensive Bayesian statistical methods become 
more and more popular [21] and these techniques play an important role in conducting a PRA [ 4, 5]. The Bayesian 
approach to statistical inference relies on the existence of a so-called prior distribution for the modeling parameters  
}{θP , which reflects the knowledge aboutθ before current data is taken into consideration. This knowledge about 
θ  can then be updated given the current data σ  to obtain the so-called posterior distribution: 
 
    ∫ •
•= θθθσ
θθσσθ
dPP
PPP
}{)|{
}{)|{}|{
    
 
Based on this posterior estimate, a predictive distribution of a future observation σ~  can be calculated: 
 
    ∫ •= θσθθσσσ dPPP }|{)|~{}|~{     
 
In contrast to the maximum likelihood method, this representation directly accounts for uncertainty in the estimation 
of the modeling parameter θ~  (since it is specified as a distribution).  In the context of reliability and safety 
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modeling, the most common application of the Bayesian technique is merging heterogeneous sources of data. The 
simplest (and possibly the least controversial) example of such situation can be described as follows:  
 
A mass produced device (i.e., transistor) has a well established statistical characterization of failure distribution that 
is used as a prior estimate. Next, the device is tested for defects and the data on the reliability of the test prediction to 
be correct is provided (i.e., avoiding false positive or negative). Then, Bayesian updating provides a consistent 
means to combine the results and, prior to obtaining posterior estimate of the probability, that the device is faulty. 
This concept is generalized to treat generic data about similar entities as prior estimates and merging it with (usually 
sparse) system-specific data.  While theoretically this approach provides a means to compensate for the lack of 
system-specific data, both at the component and system level, the final results are very sensitive to the external data, 
and the construction of a good prior estimate is crucial. However, at the system level, this presents a formidable 
challenge due to the effective uniqueness of each complex system. Samandar Roshan-Zamir (SAIC) used this 
approach by constructing a prior estimate based on civil transport aircraft data. The results do not inspire high 
confidence, as they provide prior failure rates that are almost two magnitudes lower than the Shuttle-specific data.  It 
is reasonable to suggest that rates, if anything, could be higher (due to less strict aircraft maintenance practices and 
the harsher environment seen by aircraft wiring). This Bayesian approach was abandoned in a recent SAIC updated 
report in lieu of the observed reliability approach. This does not necessarily imply that the approach is not feasible, 
but a rigorous quantification of both differences and similarities among the systems must be conducted.  Analysis of 
FAA data, provided in Appendix G of this report, provides first steps in this direction.  
Critique of the SAIC Point Estimate 
 
The point estimate (9.05E-6) relies on two failures.  A constant failure rate or, equivalently, a Homogeneous Poisson 
process is assumed. A standard procedure for providing confidence intervals bounds this estimate within [1.096E-6, 
2.521E-5] for 95% confidence. However, the following serious potential drawbacks are identified:  
 
• Aging was not considered in the analysis. Obviously, two failures do not provide enough information to support 
or reject any presence of aging; however, it is important to recognize that the absence of aging is a non-
conservative assumption. Appendix G of this report provides a strong case for significant effects of aging and, as 
shown below, the presence of aging significantly affects risk estimates. 
• This calculation uses the fact that RCS signal wires constitute approximately 0.005 fraction of all Orbiter wires. 
By definition, a wire-to-wire “smart” short implies at least TWO wires are in contact. Therefore, it should be 
assumed that the probability that at least one of the two wires is not 0.005, but rather 0.00995, unless a more de-
tailed classification of wires is provided. The point estimate changes to 1.801E-5 with a 95% confidence interval 
[2.181E-6, 5.017E-5]. Moreover, there is no certainty that only two wires participate in a short. If more wires are 
involved in a short, the probability needs to be adjusted appropriately. Out of two events that were considered 
relevant, the first event damaged six wires. If we consider those events representative (that is a wire short on 
average involves four wires, corresponding values practically double, resulting in a point estimate of 3.602E-5 
with a 95% confidence interval [4.362E-6, 1.003E-4].  
• The issue of the delectability of wire-to-wire “smart” shorts (especially intermittent ones) remains a big unknown, 
as it is recognized that ALL shorts reported in PRACA are due to the observed malfunctioning of some 
equipment. It is reasonable to assume that some intermittent shorts went unnoticed (which might explain the 
problem discussed in the previous bullet). However, such shorts are capable of causing the catastrophic event. 
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Critique of the AMES Report 
 
The PRA conducted by Kushik Datta (NASA Ames) is discussed.  
 
Review of Assumptions.  A system level approach was used in the NASA Ames PRA with the Fault Tree (FT) 
constructed to evaluate the influence of several failure modes. While the study itself was quite detailed, a few key 
assumptions are listed below that are sufficient to capture the final numerical results with good precision:  
 
• A number of exposed conductors, or significant damages to wires, were observed during the down period of OV-
102 and OV-103. For each Orbiter, the number was assumed to be SD = 470, which constituted about 10% of 
total wire damage incidents observed. These numbers were provided to K. Datta by P. Krause.  
• This observed wire damage was assumed to follow the HPP that is proportional to the wire length. Corresponding 
failure rate per feet of wires was calculated based on the following formula:  
 
λ = SD(1 − fi) 
LwiresNf 
 
where Lwires is the total length of wires in the Orbiter in feet, fi  = 0.25 fraction of wires inspected for damage in 
every turnaround, and Nf is the number of flights before major inspection of OV-102.  
• Two major mechanisms contributed to the final numbers: chafing of the wires and carbonization of wires via 
arcing. The relative frequency of these failures as compared to SD was inferred from PRACA reports: from a total 
of 1,514 reports of wire damage, there were 162 reports of chafed wires and 1 report of arcing. Therefore, Dchaf= 
162 × SD/1514 = 50 and arc tracking Darc=0.31. 
• Given the estimated length of control wires Lcontrol= 4000 ft and power wires in RJD bundles Lpower = 40000 ft, the 
rate of occurrences of chafing of a control wire λch = λ Dchaf Lcontrol =  7.284 x 10−3 and arcing of a  
SD and of a power wire is estimated λar λDar Lpower = 4.516 10−4.  
• Total probability for a single mission of two types of events is then calculated: at least one chafing of a control 
wire in a RJD bundle Pchaf = 1 − exp(−λch) =7.26 × 10−3 and, similarly, that at least one arcing takes place for a 
power wire in an RJD bundle Parc = 1 − exp(−λar) = 4.52 × 10−4. 
• Additional conditional probabilities are introduced: Pmulti = 0.1: given that a signal wire is chafed, there is a 
probability that a neighboring wire is chafed as well. (The value 0.1 is taken as a generic value of a common cause 
factor), and PSP = 0.5, corresponding to the fact that given a multiple chafing, the adjacent wire is a power one (a 
better estimate of this probability is not available). Probability of the wire-to-wire “smart” short due to chafing is 
Pwc = Parc Pmulti PSP = 3.63 × 10−4. 
• Combining arcing and chafing failure modes yields Ptot = 1 − (1 − Pwc)(1 - Parc) = 8.148 × 10−4.  The inclusion of 
all other modes changes the total number to 8.3867 × 10−4, or less than 3% difference, so the other modes are 
basically negligible.  
• It is assumed that after 1999 events, there was a 6-fold improvement in maintenance that resulted in a 6-fold 
decrease in wire damage. This factor was obtained by observing an average of a 6-fold increase of the reported 
damage in 1999 followed by the rate of reporting that is of the same magnitude as pre-1999 years. The conclusion 
was made that six times better detection of damaged wires was equivalent to a 6-fold decrease in the underlying 
failure rates. This led to the final number Pfin = 1.4 × 10−4.  
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Discussion. The Ames study was considered overly conservative, which was the primary reason for its results to be 
ultimately dismissed by the Shuttle program. It is important to mention some interesting features of this analysis that 
can be questioned, and how the changes in these assumptions alter the final numbers:  
• It is assumed that initially there was no damage to wires, and this damage uniformly accumulated during 26 
flights. The difficulty comes from the need to reconcile the issues of repairable and non-repairable systems. 
Strictly speaking, a HPP used to model wire damage is defined for repairable systems: applicability of HPP 
implies that each occurring failure is repaired, and the system is restored to its original configuration i.e., the old 
damage is removed. On the other hand, the Ames report uses the assumption of the linear damage accumulation, 
which can only be made compatible with HPP if a different time scale is considered. The latter time scale is 
equal to 26 flights:  it is assumed that after OMDP in 1999 ALL the damage was detected and removed. In 
addition to the issue of detectability (which cannot be 100%), the model does not account for regular 
maintenance. 
• Damaged wire does not necessarily cause an immediate short. Use of the larger time scale effectively averages 
the occurrences of wire shorts over 26 flights without addressing potential inequalities in risks between the 
flights right after and before OMDP (it seems reasonable to assume that the risk is lowest right after OMDP as 
the number of damages wires is the lowest). 
• There was no distinction made as to when during the turn-around cycle the failure occurred. This is a very 
conservative assumption, that can be easily replaced with a more realistic assumption that the damage is perma-
nent and immediately detected, which leads to a simple calculation of a correction factor by dividing the 
docking time by the total power-on time during one cycle (based on the values provided in the SAIC report, this 
would yield Pfirstdoc = 0.090546).  
• It is not clear why fi is introduced: whatever the percentage of the detection was per turnaround, if anything, its 
effect should be the opposite (as it increases the total number of damage accumulated between two OMDPs). 
• A 6-fold improvement in the rates of damage cannot be assumed.  
• As shown in Appendix G, the no-aging assumption might be too optimistic. 
 
Present Approach  
Justification for a Dynamic Model for Wire Damage 
The goal of the constructed numerical model is to provide an estimate of the probability of failure occurring during a 
single mission, and for the duration of the program 
A notional FTA for a short in a RJD bundle is shown in Figure C-2. Here, Event A characterizes the likelihood of 
relevant wire damage in the RJD bundle, while Events S and D provide additional conditions for the short to occur. 
S is a (composite) representation of static events (the conditions either exist or they don’t): power and signal wires 
are next to each other or not; given a current spike, a fuse blows or doesn’t, etc. In contrast, D is a (composite) 
representation of a dynamic event that can occur continuously in time and, therefore, should be characterized by the 
rate of occurrence.  
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Figure C-2. Notional Fault Tree for a short in RJD bundle 
 
It is realistic to assume that Event A reflects the total amount of damaged wires, while events of Type D will 
provide a dynamic representation of the additional processes required for a short to occur. In the following text, a 
type of each event is specified for clarity.  
Let us also note the subtlety of properly accounting for the possibility of having more than one instance of damaged 
wires in a RJD bundle. This is a relevant issue assuming the Ames report numbers for SD, NSD= 470 leads to the ex-
pected value of SD for signal wires in the RJD bundle to be Fcontrol=2.374. While one can calculate a probability that 
at least one instance of damaged wires exist in the RJD bundle, the use of that value in the fault tree will lead to 
underestimating the probability of the top-level event.  Instead, frequency of occurrence should be used. To take 
advantage of standard fault tree software tools that require probability values as inputs (which obviously must be 
less than 1), it is convenient to appropriately adjust the values of two events comprising the same AND gate. For 
example, if the proper values for events A and C in Figure C-2 are 374.2=AQ  and Q , then by 
introducing an auxiliary factor m , one can provide valid entries to the fault tree that do not alter the 
probability of the top level event: 
02.0=C
10=
2374.0=
m
QA=PA  and 2.0== CC mQP . 
Damage Accumulation (Aging) 
 
Modeling of the Space Shuttle wiring presents a particular challenge due to the difficulties of applying conventional 
notions of repairable systems. In particular, an assumption of HPP implies that upon each failure the system is 
repaired and returned to “as new” condition. One can hardly claim that wire inspections lead to a 100% success in 
repairing wires, so the definitions of “as new” and “absence of aging” must be defined with caution.  
It is quite reasonable to assume that the probability of wire shorts is proportional to the total amount of damaged 
wires present in the Shuttle at any point in time. A simplified schematic of the associated processes is shown in 
Figure C-3. It is convenient to use a single shuttle turn-around as a unit time. Then, λ1 is defined as the transition 
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rate for the wires that “naturally” degrade over time; λ2 corresponds to the maintenance induced damage rate (with λ 
= λ1+ λ2 corresponding to the total damage rate, while µ denotes the rate of detected and repaired wires).  
 
Figure C-3. Sources of changes in the total wire damage (A), corresponding Markov chain (B) and 
Stochastic Petri Net (C) 
Most of the factors that are contributing to the wire damage in the Orbiter are discrete events with respect to time. 
However, it is convenient to represent routine life cycle of an Orbiter using continuous time. Only the last baseline 
maintenance and the 1999 stand-downs are explicitly modeled as discrete events due to their significance and non-
recurring nature. Let us denote the total amount of relevant damaged wires with N (the relevant categories of 
damage include exposed and damaged conductor). Noting that damage is measured in instances (discrete), while the 
wire is measured in unit of length (continuous), we may choose the unit of length that is small enough to neglect the 
possibility of having more than one damage per unit length (e.g., feet as opposed to miles). Then we can introduce a 
non-dimensional quantity,
tot
N
tN
ty
)(
)( = , where is the total amount of wire in the chosen units which 
effectively measures the probability that a given wire segment of unit length contains damage.  The equation for 
 has the following form: 
tot
N
)(ty
 
     ( )( ) )()(2)(11)( tyttyt µλλ −+−dtdy =   
The equation above is a first order differential equation so, for any time segment, an initial condition needs to be 
specified. Three time segments are used (as appropriate):  
 
1. Initial installation, stand down (1999).  
2. Stand down (1999), the last OMDP.  
3. The last OMDP, future operations.  
 
Initially, it is reasonable to avoid any differentiation among the wires, with understanding that further refinement of 
the model is possible with the rates being different for various locations (depending on the accessibility of the 
wires).  
If all those rates do not change with time, the corresponding process can be represented as a Markov chain where λ1 
and λ2 are combined into a single transitional rate (see Figure C-3B). In contrast, increasing with time λ1 (t) 
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corresponds to the “wear-out” portion of the bath-tub curve, which for non-reparable components (such as 
individual wires) can be modeled using Weibull distribution with the shape parameter κ> 1.  Such modeling can be 
implemented using Stochastic Petri Nets as depicted in Figure C-3C. 
It is important to note that even if λ1 is constant (i.e., κ = 1), the total amount of damaged wires (and therefore the 
probability of wire shorts) can still increase in time.  For example, in the situation where µ = 0 (i.e., for wires that 
are not accessible), damaged wires will certainly accumulate (albeit possibly at a slow rate).  
To account for events that occurred in 1999, two-phase modeling can be implemented.  At the beginning of the 
second phase, a significant amount of wire damage was repaired, and consequently λ2 has been significantly reduced 
(Ames report cites a 100-fold decrease in the induced damage due to new procedures), while µ is increased (Ames 
report assumes 6-fold increase of delectability). It is reasonable to suggest that λ1 remains unchanged since no 
changes in operating condition and storage environment can be identified. 
 
Wire-to-Wire “Smart” Short Model 
 
In constructing a model for evolution of wire damage, an attempt was made to attain a balance between fidelity and 
simplicity. The following parameters are considered to be an input to the model:  
 
1. INITIAL: Q1 fraction of all damaged wires (existing during the last OMDP) that were introduced during initial 
installation.  
2. DETECTBEFORE: Q2 average effectiveness of inspections before 1999 (per turn-around) includes prior 
OMDP.  
3. DETECTMAJOR: Q3 measures effectiveness of the last OMDP: the fraction of detected significant damage 
(damaged and exposed conductor) to the total amount of significant damage existing in the Orbiter at the time 
of OMDP.  
4. DETECTAFTER: Q4 effectiveness of routine inspections after 1999.  
5. WEIBULL: Q5 Weibull shape factor for all wire damage accumulation excluding maintenance-induced damage.  
6. MAINTCAUSE: Q6 fraction of damage accruing in the Orbiter that is maintenance-induced (as opposed to all 
other sources of accumulated damage). Please note that this parameter is related to damage accumulation that 
occurs after initial installation (and therefore is independent on parameter Q1). 
7. MAINTIMPROVE: Q7 fraction of maintenance-induced damage after 1999 as compared to pre-1999 
procedures. This parameter is an inverse of the maintenance improvement factor that quantifies the amount of 
induced damage.  
 
The list of numerical value-related parameters is provided in Table C-1. 
Once parameters Q1-Q7 are defined, the model is constructed as follows:  
• Amount of relevant significant damage number of instances of (damaged and exposed conductor), Ne is 
determined for the last OMDP. The total amount of damage present in the system during that OMDP is calculated 
as: 
 
3
Q
Ne
N =  
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• Initial amount of damage is evaluated: Ni= Q1Nt. This value provides the initial condition for the damage 
evolution for the first time segment. 
• Repair rate µ(t) for each time segment must be consistent with the assumed levels of detection, as the absolute 
values of the “outflow” of damage (that is, the amount of removed damage in accordance with the model) should 
correspond to the observed amount of detected significant damage.  
• Let us assume that λ1(t) follows Weibull distribution:                     
 
 
here Q5 provides κ. Furthermore, given Q6 (the ratio of induced and “natural” failures before 1999), one can 
express λ2 in terms of θ. Finally Q7 allows to express changes in λ2 after 1999. Therefore, θ uniquely defines 
failure rates for all time segments. Therefore, the solution of the differential equation with θ as a parameter 
presents an equation  which can be solved to determine θ.  
e
N
OMDP
tN =),( θ
κ
κ
κ
θλ
1
1 )(
−
= tt
 
The time history for OV-103 of exposed and damaged conductors is shown in Figure C-4 for 35 flights, where 
stand-down takes place after 26 flights and major inspection (OMDP) takes place after 30 flights. Three curves 
correspond to different values of Q4 from Table C-1.  Based on the preliminary comparison with the historical data, 
Q4=0.1 appears to be reasonable. Note that for OV-102, OMDP coincided with the stand-down period. The estimate 
directly uses exposed and damaged conductors as the relevant damage. The fault tree is constructed for the 33rd 
flight of OV-103. Figure C-4 shows a somewhat counter-intuitive trend: after 1999, the amount of damage decreases 
due to routine maintenance, which seems to obviate any need for OMDP.  Based on the investigation of PRACA 
data for OV-103 (see Appendix G), one can conclude that values Q5 and Q6 from Table C-1 can be significantly 
different from what was assumed initially. Figure C-5 demonstrates the changes in total damage for 33rd and 36th 
flights with all the parameters kept the same, but varying Q5 (in accordance with Appendix G, the value 2.2 can be 
suggested). 
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Figure C-4. History of Total Number of Wire Significant Damage  
(based on the parameters given in Table C-1) 
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Figure C-5. Sensitivity to Weibull Shape Function: Q6=0.9  
 
It can be observed that for these other parameter values, the sensitivity with respect to Weibull shape parameter is 
minor. The fault tree depicted in Figures C-8 through C-14 is based on the total amount of significant damage being 
204.322 (see Table C-2 and also left of Figure C-5). It must be noted that the top-level value is almost directly 
proportional to the amount of significant damage. However, the situation is drastically changing if we also take 
advantage of the data provided in Appendix G with respect to the ratio of induced damage. Therein, the statistics 
shows that the ratio of such damage can be as low as 0.175. Taken into account Q1, one can conclude that Q6 = 
0.20588. Figure C-6 demonstrates the results of dynamic wire damage model: the amount of damage is doubled for 
the 33rd flight and tripled for the 36th flight, causing similar magnitude of changes to top-level event estimates (under 
this scenario the total value of risk for 33rd flight becomes 3.26 10-4). 
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Figure C-6. Sensitivity to Weibull Shape Function: Q6=0.206  
 
Event Description 
 
Events 1 to 15 are described below.  For the fault tree, the source of wire damage is not differentiated (as it is 
modeled separately), so several failure modes are grouped together. The following mapping can be identified to the 
FMEA list from 6.30.04:   
 
Modes 4, 5, 6 as well as 13 and 14 correspond to WWSHORT/WWCONTACT/SMART gate;  
Mode 7 to WWSHORT/WWCONTACT /INDUCED/CONTAMINATED;  
Mode 8 to WWSHORT/WWCONTACT /INDUCED/CONDUCTOR; and  
Mode 11 to WWSHORT/WWCONTACT/ARCING/ARC/GROUND. 
 
 
1. FIRSTDOC: Probability that a uniformly-distributed event (such as a short) occurs for the first time during 
docking. P1 is calculated as a fraction of the docking time to the total power-on time: P = Tdocking/(Tinflight+ 
Tground) = 0.090546.  Appropriate numbers are extracted from the SAIC Report: Tinflight = 29722h/113 = 
263.02 and Tground = (193352-29722)/98 = 1669.7.   Please note that different numbers of flights were used 
to calculate ground and flight hours in the SAIC report.  
2. FARFIELD (type S): Arc reaches a coil wire.  
3. POWERDAMAGE: Frequency of damage in power wire in the RJD bundle to be compromised where the 
value is proportional to the total length of “capable” (i.e., denoted in blue on the connector 22P67 diagram) 
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wires. AMES used the assumption that there are 40k feet of such wires (10 times more than signal wires). 
Based on the connector configuration, this number can be too large (in the table, the 4k value is used 
instead, which might be a conservative assumption). This value is directly proportional to Pdamage: Fpower = 
PdamageLpowerηcomprom. Here ηcomprom refers to the fraction of wire damage that is relevant to creating a power 
short (in the present calculation, ηcomprom = 1.0).  Note the value of Pdamage used in the fault tree corresponds 
to the 33rd flight of OV-103 (see Figure C-3).  
4. EXPOSED: Frequency of exposed wires for control wire in RJD bundle. This value is directly 
proportional to Pdamage: Fcontrol = PdamageLcontrolηexposed. Here, η exposed refers to the fraction of wire damage 
that provides enough exposed conductor that leads to the short (the same as previous).  
5. CCF:  Neighboring wires are exposed (Common Cause Failure) and are in close contact. This is not 
improbable since two neighboring wires are likely to be exposed to a similar environment. This event is 
considered to be dynamic (of type D, as described above). The probability of this event per single flight is 
based on the following calculation where two inputs are used: Pet (total probability that event will happen).  
Dexp (expected delay associated with this event):  




−=
exp
1exp1
D
PP etevent (constant failure rate is as-
sumed to minimize number of parameters).  
6. NEARFIELD (type S): One of the exposed neighboring wires is power. Significantly less than 0.5 if 
22P67 connector is representative. Still non-negligible since wires can change their relative positions away 
from connectors (and other connector can be different).  
7. WWCONTACT (type S): Two neighboring damaged wires enter into close contact (the contact is 
sufficient to initiate a short).  
WGCONTACT (Event 7a, type D): Compromised segment of wire contacts ground. Total probability is 
lowered from 0.5 to 0.05 in accordance with Glenn Williams’ comments on July 5, 2004. Calculations are 
analogous to CCF event.  
8. SLOW1 (type S): Initiation of wire-to-ground contact is slow enough (low current) to allow carbonization. 
Per discussion with Mark Hetzel, this event is less likely than Event 10 since the short with ground is more 
likely to be swift (i.e., high current), thus tripping the fuse before carbonization.  
9. CCF2 (type D): Neighboring power wiring is damaged (Common Cause Failure) and in close contact. It is 
likely to be significantly higher than Event 5 as power wires are expected to be a twisted pair and damage 
of the wires, rather than exposed wire, is required (similar in the Event 8, the scale factor of 100 is used to 
balance Event 3).  
10. SLOW2:  Initiation of wire-to-wire contact is slow enough (low current) to allow carbonization. See Event 
8, with two wires damaged, but not fully exposed, slow (low current) event is more likely.  
11. CONTAMINATION: Contamination occurs that rapidly degrades wire integrity. Improbable.  
12. UNDETECTED: Contamination is undetected long enough to damage wires.  
13. WWINDUCED: Damaged wire led to a short between power and signal wire, either directly via smart 
short or indirectly via arcing. Can be developed further to investigate the modes similar to ARCING and 
SMART gates (see the fault tree). However, the impact of this event is minimal.  
14. EXTCONDUCTOR: External conductor is introduced remote.  
15. CRACKED: Relevant wires are compromised. Proportional to the total damage similar to Events 3 and 4; 
η allows for damage of both signal and power wire. However, total probability rather than frequency of 
occurrence is required.  
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Darlington Pair 
The failure modes are grouped in the following broad categories: Internal Transistor, RJD Wiring, Induced 
Failures, Connector Failures, and Sensitivity to RJD Power-on. 
Internal Transistor 
Total failure rates of two transistors for a Darlington pair are taken to be λ3 = 5.0×10−8and λ4 = 2.0×10−8, respectively 
(based on AT&T Reliability Manual [ 22]. In the present PRA, it is assumed that approximately 60% of all failures 
result in a transistor short. It must be noted that 0.01% used in the SAIC report is considered to be unrealistic. In 
fact, one of the RAC sources indicates as much as 73% of all the transistor failures lead to shorts. There are 38 
thrusters, and the total operating time is assumed to be five hours. The total probability of at least one failure during 
this time frame is PDS = 1 − [exp (−5× 0.6×(λ3+ λ4))]38 = 7.98 × 10−6. 
 
This total probability is apportioned among the following five modes. This apportionment does not affect the 
probability of the top-level event, but identification of these modes can be important for the follow up analysis.  
 
16. COLEMITT (Mode 19): Collector to emitter short of any driver or output Darlington transistor. Cited in 
the SAIC report where 0.1% fraction of total failures is not considered to be credible, instead 20% of total 
shorts are assumed.  
17. COLBASE (Mode 20): Collector to base short of any driver or output Darlington transistor. Similarly to 
the previous mode cited in the SAIC report where 0.1% fraction of total failures is not considered to be 
credible, instead 20% of total shorts are assumed.  
18. DCONTAM (Mode 23): The following modes from the SAIC report are identified as relevant to this 
group: Conductive contaminant in any driver or output; Contamination; and Contaminated (1.9% and 0.1% 
of total transistor failures, respectively). In the present study, 20% of total shorts are contributed to this 
group.  
19. DARLEAK (Mode 16): Excessive leakage current due to aging, degraded metallization, or leaky hermetic 
seal in a driver Darlington transistor. Several modes relevant to this group are identified from Appendix B 
in the SAIC report (values shown are reported percentages of total transistor failures: Metallization 0.7%, 
Seal Failure 0.6%, High Leakage Current 0.6%, Leakage 0.3%, and Hermetic Leakage 0.1%). Presently, 
30% of shorts are contributed to this group.  
20. INTERMETALLIC (New mode suggested by Henning Leidecker) Growth of intermettalic com-
pounds in wire bond: This can lead to either open or erratic resistant conditions. The SAIC report list con-
tains the following modes: “Wire bond failure” and “Intermetallic growth” (0.7% and 0.1% of total 
transistor failures, respectively). Presently, 10% of shorts are assumed to contribute to the shorts of the 
transistor.  
 
RJD Wiring 
21. TRANSFORMER (Mode 31): Internal RJD box wire short of any driver or output Darlington transistor 
emitter, or base lead wire to 28 VDC conductor or terminal due to degradation of the insulation 
transformer. Currently, the probability of this failure is considered to be negligibly small.  
22. LEAKPATH (Mode 15):  Internal leakage path across circuit board or wiring (most likely scenario is 
Teflon’s cold flow). This type of failure corresponds to “infant mortality” events, and it is expected that it 
would have happened already. The resulting probability is considered to be negligible.  
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23. INTCONT (Mode 23): Conductive (liquid?) contaminant between Darlington transistor case and base pin. 
Failure rate is assumed to be λ23= 1.0× 10−9.  There are 38 thrusters operating for five hours, so the total 
probability of at least one failure during this time frame is P23 = 1 - [exp (−5(λ23))]38 = 1.9 × 10−7. 
24. WHISKERS (Mode 23): Another possible source of conductive contaminant between the Darlington 
transistor case and base pin. Failure rate is assumed to be λ23b=1.0 × 10−9. The calculations that are identical 
to the previous item also provide the total probability 1.9 × 10−7. 
Induced Failures 
25. Mode 18 Shorted Darlington: Output transistor caused by turn on into an intermittent output command 
wire short to chassis that shorts transistor but does not open 7A fuse. SLOWFUSE Measure of the short to 
be “intermittent enough” to damage transistor before the fuse blows, assumed to be 0.01.  
26. Mode 25 ESD (immediate and latent): Output transistor.  There is a protection, but human errors can be 
potentially important. More modeling is desirable. Based on total rate 1.0E-7. 
27. ENERGIZED:  For a failure Mode 18 to occur, the RJD box needs to be powered on during the short. 
Connector Failures 
This portion of the FT has not been developed, but corresponds to Mode 3.  
Sensitivity to RJD Power-on 
Figure C-7 demonstrates sensitivity of the probability of inadvertent firing due to a Darlington pair failure as a 
function of powered-on time of the RJD box during mating.  Note that all other assumptions are kept the same and 
the time is varied between 0.5 and 20 hours.  
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Figure C-7. Sensitivity of Darlington Pair Failure with Respect to Powered On Time During Mating 
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Table C-1. Input Parameters to Wire Damage Evolution Model 
 
  Confidence levels: HIGH MEDIUM LOW 
      
Par Name Description Value (P) Justification Source/Comparison 
1 INITIAL  
Fraction of damaged 
wires that were 
damaged from the 
very beginning 
0.15 
It is assumed that 15% of 
the damage detected 
during OMDP are due to 
initial installation     
2 DETECTBEFORE 
Fraction of detected 
(and repaired) 
damage per turn-
around before 1999 
(includes OMDP) 
0.04 
Note that average SD 
per flight recorded in 
PRACA prior to 1999 is 
about 17 SD, model 
should be consistent with 
PRACA data   
3 DETECTMAJOR 
Fraction of detected 
damage during the 
last OMDP 
0.7 
    
4 DETECTAFTER 
Fraction of detected 
damage per turn-
around after 1999 
0.1 Previously assumed 0.2 
is too high, based on the 
data for 0V-103 (unless 
other parameters from 
this model are changed) 
NASA Ames report 
assumes that the 
ratio between P4 and 
P2 is 1: 6 (but therein 
effects of 
MAINTIMPROVE are 
rolled in as well) 
5 WEIBULL 
Weibull shape 
parameter associated 
with the damage that 
is not maintenance 
induced.  
1 (2.2) 
Initially constant failure 
rate was considered 
(value 1). Data in 
Appendix G suggests 
value as high as 2.2 (see 
Figures C-4 and C-5).   
6 MAINTCAUSE 
Fraction of new 
damaged that was 
induced by 
maintenance (before 
1999) 
0.9 (0.206) 
It was initially assumed 
that 90% of damage is 
induced leading to 0.9 
value.  However, in 
accordance with 
Appendix G, the induced 
damage constitutes 
about 0.175 of the total 
damage, which leads to 
the value of Q6 as low as 
0.206   
7 MAINTIMPROVE 
Fraction of 
maintenance induced 
damage after 99 as 
compared to pre- 99 
procedures  
0.1 
10 times improvement is 
assumed 
Ames report cites  
P6 to P7 as 100: 1 
sion: 
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Table C-2. Basic Events For Wire-To-Wire Fault Tree 
 Type:  S- static (no delay);  D- dynamic (delay specified) INPUT   
    
 Total amount  of significant damage 204.3       
Event Name Type Description Delay (flights) 
total 
P η 
wire 
length (ft) 
Value 
for 
FTA 
Justification 
1 
FIRSTDOC 
S 
Short occurs for the first time 
during docking 0       0.09055 
Fraction of powered operation during 
docking. Exposure is consistent with 
SAIC report. 
2 
FARFIELD S Arc reaches a coil wire 0       0.6 
Even near connector the wires are 
separated only by two wires. 
3 
POWERDAMAGE 
S 
Frequency of power wire 
compromised in RJD bundle 0   1 4000 4.25666 
22P67 RJD bundle has half as many 
power wires as coil wires (i.e. 2000 feet), 
here 4000 is used; amount of significant 
damage is from wire damage evolution 
model; Fraction of relevant damage is 
given as 1 (damaged and exposed 
conductor). 
4 
EXPOSED S Frequency of coil wire exposed 0   1 4000 4.25666 
4k of wires, fraction of relevant damage is 
1 (the same as above). 
5 
CCF 
D 
Neighboring wire is exposed 
(Common Cause Failure) 5 0.1     0.01813 
This is not improbable, as two 
neighboring wires are likely to be exposed 
to similar environment.  
6 
NEARFIELD 
S 
One of the exposed neighboring 
wire happens to be power 0       0.2 
Non-negligible, even if 22P67 connector 
is representative, as wires can change 
their relative positions away from 
connectors. NASA Ames report used a 
generic value 0.1. 
7 
WWCONTACT S 
Two damaged wires come in close 
contact         0.05 
Can be considered to be dynamic. 
7a 
WGCONTACT D 
Compromised segment of power 
wire contacts ground 6 0.03     0.00461 
  
8 
SLOW1 
S 
Initiation of wire-to-ground contact 
is slow enough (low current) to 
allow carbonization 
0       0.005 
This event is less likely than event 10 as 
the short with ground is more likely to be 
swift (i.e. high current), thus tripping the 
fuse before carbonization.  
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Table C-2. Basic Events For Wire-To-Wire Fault Tree 
Type:  S- static (no delay);  D- dynamic (delay specified) INPUT   
Total amount  of significant damage 204.3       
ent Name Type Description Delay (flights) 
total 
P η 
wire 
length (ft) 
Value 
for 
FTA 
Justification 
 
 
 
Ev
9 
CCF2 
D 
Given damaged power wire, a 
neighboring return wire is damaged 
(Common Cause Failure) and the 
two are in close contact 
5 0.2     0.03625 
Likely to be significantly higher than 
Event 5 as power wires are expected to be 
a twisted pair that is more prone to 
tracking. 
10 
SLOW2 
S 
Initiation of wire-to-wire (power to 
return) contact is slow enough (low 
current) to allow carbonization 
0       0.2 
See Event 8, with two wires damaged, but 
not fully exposed, slow (low current) 
event is more likely. 
11 
CONTAMINATION S 
Contamination occurs that rapidly 
degrades wire integrity 0       1.0E-04 
Corresponds to "remote" probability 
12 
UNDETECTED S 
Contamination is undetected long 
enough to damage wires 0       0.001 
  
13 
WWINDUCED 
D 
Damaged wire led to a short 
between power and signal wire 
(either directly via smart short or 
indirectly via arcing) 
        0.2 
Modes are similar to ARCING and 
SMART gates (see the fault tree) except 
occurring in an accelerated fashion 
estimated here as 0.2 is not developed 
further due to low probability of Events 
11 and 12. 
14 
EXTCONDUCTOR 
S 
External conductor is introduced         1.0E-03 
Can be conductive liquid media or debris 
(like event 11 is considered to be a remote 
probability) 
15 
CRACKED 
D 
Relevant wires are compromised      0.05 4000 0.19171 
Proportional to the total damage; allows 
for damage of both coil and power wire; 
total probability rather than frequency of 
occurrence is required.  
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Table C-3.  Basic events for Darlington Pair Fault Tree 
 
Event Name Description Value (P) Justification 
16 
COLEMITT Collector to emitter short of any 
driver or output Darlington transistor, 
Mode 4 
1.596 E-6 
Events 16-20 based on two units 5 10-
8 and 2.0 10-8 and 60% is of 
transistor shorts.  This leads to the 
total probability of failure due to 
Darlington pairs Pds=7.98 E-6 (for 38 
thrusters for 5 hours of operation, see 
main text. The event contributes 20% 
17 
COLBASE 
Collector to base short of any driver 
or output Darlington transistor, Mode 
5 
1.596 E-6 
Event 17 is 0.2 Pds (see Event 16) 
18 
DCONTAM 
Conductive contaminant in any driver 
or output Darlington transistor, Mode 
6 
1.596 E-6 
Event 18 is 0.2 Pds (see Event 16) 
19 
DARLEAK 
Excessive leakage current due to 
aging, degraded metallization, or 
leaky hermetic seal in a driver 
Darlington transistor; Mode 7, 27 
2.394 E-6 
Event 19 is 0.3 Pds (see Event 16) 
20 
 
INTERMETALLIC Growth of intermetallic compounds wire bond (New mode, HL) 
7.98 E-7 
Event 20 is 0.1 Pds (see Event 16) 
21 
TRANSFORMER 
Degradation of the isolation 
transformer Mode 9, 24b 
0 
Lower than transistor unless 150 
degrees is 1-2 10-9 or high voltage 
subject Spice analysis irrelevant. 
22 
LEAKPATH Internal leakage path across circuit 
board or wiring Modes 9, 24a, 31 
0 
No multi-layer circuit board, only 
wire can pinched, highly unlikely, 
cold Teflon flow given that it did not 
happen (needs to be checked against 
PRACA). 
23 
INTCONT 
 Conductive (liquid?) contaminant 
between or debris 
case and base pin Modes 10, 26 
1.9 E-7 
 Debris like a single screw filing. The 
number is based on a failure rate 1E-9 
per hour for a single thruster 
24 WHISKERS Another source of conductive 
contaminant 10,26 
1.9 E-7 Conformally coated, the odds are that 
we do not have tin whiskers. The 
number is based on a failure rate 1E-9 
per hour for a single thruster 
25 SLOWFUSE Transistor fails before the fuse blows 0.01 Measure of the short to be 
"intermittent enough" to damage 
transistor before the fuse blows. 
26 ESD Transistor failure induced by ESD 5.0 E-7 Output transistor.  There is a 
protection but human errors can be 
potentially important. More modeling 
is desirable. Based on total rate (not 
for individual transistor of 1.0E-7). 
27 ENERGIZED RJD box is energized 0.3   
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Figure C-8. Fault Tree (page 1 of 7) 
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Figure C-9.  Fault Tree (page 2 of 7) 
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Figure C-10. Fault Tree (page 3 of 7) 
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Figure C-11. Fault Tree (page 4 of 7) 
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Figure C-12. Fault Tree (page 5 of 7) 
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Figure C-13. Fault Tree (page 6 of 7) 
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Figure C-14. Fault Tree (page 7 of 7) 
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Appendix D 
Darlington Transistor Test Plan 
 
Statement of Work for Hi-Rel Laboratories, Inc., to Test Space Shuttle Darlington Pair 
Transistors for the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Reaction Jet Driver 
Independent Technical Assessment 
 
Rick Gilbrech, NESC Deputy Director (757-864-2400) 
3/21/05 (revision K) 
 
Background 
 
The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) has a zero fault tolerant design related to an inadvertent firing 
of the primary reaction control jets on the Orbiter during mated operations with the International 
Space Station (ISS).  There are 44 thrusters on each Orbiter, 38 primary thruster (870 lbf thrust 
each) and 6 vernier thrusters (24 lbf thrust each).  Failure modes which result in a failed-on 
primary thruster during mated operations with ISS drive forces that exceed the structural 
capabilities of the docked Shuttle/ISS structure.  This catastrophic scenario has been an accepted 
risk by both programs in the past based on the probability estimates of this event occurring being 
remote (10-3 to 10-6 per operational opportunity) to improbable (<10-6).  NESC was asked by 
NASA’s Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer to review the issue and render a technical 
opinion on the probability of a catastrophic failure related to this scenario.  One root cause of an 
inadvertent primary thruster firing is failure (fail short) of the reaction jet driver (RJD) 
Darlington pair switch.  This test program will address aging or manufacturing defects in a 
sample set of SSP flight transistor assets.  
 
Statement of Work 
 
The scope of the effort for Hi-Rel is to conduct a series of tests identified below on Darlington 
pair transistors (JANTXV2N5038 and JANTXV2N5665) to be supplied by the NESC.  These 
will include fifty (50) non-flight pathfinder pairs, two (2) SSP flight spare pairs and two (2) SSP 
flown pairs.  This test plan will be jointly reviewed and approved by NESC, the SSP liaison and 
Hi-Rel.  The fifty (50) non-flight transistor pairs will be screened and the four (4) best 
performing pairs will be used as pathfinders to validate the test fixtures and procedures.  
Matching of pathfinder transistors shall be performed by individually screening each transistor at 
100 °C to find the four best performers (lowest ICEO @ 32 VCE) of each type.  The best four 
performing transistors of each type (JANTXV2N5038 and JANTXV2N5665) will be randomly 
paired as the pathfinder sets.  These shall be marked for traceability per Steps 1b through 1d 
below and then put through the full testing identified in Steps 2a through 2i.  Successful review 
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and approval of the pathfinder data by the NESC and SSP liaisons will be required prior to 
proceeding with tests of the flight spare/flown transistors.  The flight spare/flown transistor will 
be marked for traceability per Steps 1b through 1d and then put through the full testing identified 
in Steps 3a through 3i.  Finally, the remaining 92 transistors will characterized at higher VCE in 
Steps 4a through 4b. 
 
NESC and the SSP liaison will reserve the right to inspect the facilities at Hi-Rel to be used and 
witness the tests (both pathfinder and flight articles) with at least a two-week notice prior to 
testing.  Any deviations from this test plan must be reviewed and approved by the NESC and 
the Space Shuttle Program via Rick Gilbrech. 
 
General Requirements: 
 
• All material shall be handled in accordance with NASA-STD-9739.7, Electrostatic Discharge 
(ESD) control, methods and procedures. 
• A log of all steps and data shall be maintained with the initials of the person(s) conducting 
the test recorded for each step performed.  All data shall be entered into this log along with 
the unique identification for the transistor being tested. 
• Photographic and video records of the testing shall be maintained. 
• All testing shall be conducted in the presence of NASA representatives. 
• When being conducted, Destructive Physical Analysis (DPA) shall be performed on each 
part per MIL-STD-1580B.   
 
1) Initial Materials Inspection 
 
Inspect material per MIL-STD-1580B for the following: 
 
a) Transistor pairs should be bagged in appropriate ESD control material.  The bag should 
be free from tears and punctures and sealed.  Each bag should contain the “matched” 
Darlington transistor pair comprising: 
i) Two individual transistors, each individually bagged – a 2N5665 and a 2N5038. 
ii) A separate ESD control bag containing identifying paperwork. 
b) Ensure that each transistor received has been marked with unique identification.  Paper 
labels with adhesives backing shall not be used. 
c) Ensure that a “matched” Darlington transistor pair can be positively associated with one 
another. 
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d) Ensure that a “matched” Darlington transistor pair can be associated as originating from 
NESC pathfinder stock, Space Shuttle Program flight spare stock or removed from a 
flown RJD. 
 
2) NESC Pathfinder Darlington Transistor Testing, Four (4) Best-Performing Pairs 
 
The tests described in this section shall be performed on the pathfinder Darlingtons formed 
by the random pairing of the four transistors of each type having lowest ICEO @ 32 VCE.  
The performance of additional electrical tests, noted herein, shall be conducted in addition to 
the DPA.  The sequencing of tests will be performed in the order listed. 
 
For all burn-in and active tests, power shall be applied by slowly increasing the power supply 
voltage from zero to the target value. 
 
a) Perform electrical tests on individual parts at -55 °C, +25 °C and +125 °C, utilizing a 
curve tracer.  Capture curve tracer plots via electronic image capture or photographic 
means for all parts.  Ensure that temperatures have stabilized before recording the data 
and that the plots have sufficient magnification to enable the values for leakage current to 
be resolved. When performing these tests, VCE shall be limited to 32 Vdc.  All 
operational parameters shall be restricted as necessary to limit power dissipation and to 
stay within the operating limits specified in MIL-S-19500/439 (for the 2N5038) or MIL-
S-19500/455A (for the 2N5665). 
b) Review data to look for evidence of transistor aging or damage by comparing parts 
removed from RJD flight units versus those from flight spare and pathfinder stock.  If no 
evidence of damage can be discerned from the data, and if the NASA representatives 
concur, proceed with further testing. 
c) Establish original Darlington pairing and perform power-ON burn-in with pairs 
configured per equivalent RJD circuit (Figure 1) for 96 hours at 100 °C.  Confirm that the 
Darlington output is switching by monitoring the voltage across the 11 Ω load resistor 
with an oscilloscope. 
d) Separate parts and re-perform electrical tests at -55 °C, +25 °C and 125 °C.  Capture 
curve tracer plots via electronic image capture or photographic means for all parts. 
e) Repeat step b). 
f) Re-establish the original Darlington pairing and perform the tests in Table 1 of 
Honeywell drawing 34024047 (Figure 4).  
g) Perform MIL-STD–1580 non-destructive tests on each part (fine and gross hermeticity, 
particle induced noise detection (PIND) and radiographic). 
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h) Perform PIND tests on individual transistors using the methods specified in MIL-STD-
750D (Notice 3, or later), Method 2052.2, Test Condition A.  In addition to the acoustic 
detection described in the method, monitor for electrical conduction using the circuits 
depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3.  Capture evidence of transistor conduction by 
monitoring the voltage across the 1 kΩ load resistor using a digital storage oscilloscope.  
Should they occur, record representative instances of conduction via electronic image 
capture or photograph. 
i) Continue with destructive DPA tests per MIL-STD–1580 (residual gas analysis (RGA), 
internal visual, scanning electron microscope (SEM), bond pull, die shear).  RGA shall be 
conducted on the four pathfinders.  Record observations photographically, as appropriate. 
 
3) Space Shuttle Program Flight and Flight Spare Darlington Transistor Testing  
 
The tests described in this section shall be performed on the flight and flight-spare Darlington 
transistor pairs.  The performance of additional electrical tests, noted herein, shall be 
conducted in addition to the DPA.  The sequencing of tests will be performed in the order 
listed. 
 
For all burn-in and active tests, power shall be applied by slowly increasing the power supply 
voltage from zero to the target value. 
 
a) Perform electrical tests on individual parts at -55 °C, +25 °C and +125 °C, utilizing a 
curve tracer.  These will include base to emitter junction forward and reverse bias 
characterization, base to collector junction forward and reverse bias characterization and 
gain family of curves with VCE limited to 32 Vdc.  Additional tests will include collector 
to emitter leakage current at both 20 and 32 Vdc.  Capture curve tracer plots via 
electronic image capture or photographic means for all parts.  Ensure that temperatures 
have stabilized before recording the data and that the plots have sufficient magnification 
to enable the values for leakage current to be resolved.  All operational parameters shall 
be restricted as necessary to limit power dissipation and to stay within the operating 
limits specified in MIL-S-19500/439 (for the 2N5038) or MIL-S-19500/455A (for the 
2N5665).   
b) Review data to look for evidence of transistor aging or damage by comparing parts 
removed from RJD flight units versus those from flight spare and pathfinder stock.  If no 
evidence of damage can be discerned from the data, and if the NASA representatives 
concur, proceed with further testing. 
c) Establish original Darlington pairing and perform power-ON burn-in with pairs 
configured per equivalent RJD circuit (Figure 1) for 96 hours at 100 °C.  Confirm that the 
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Darlington output is switching by monitoring the voltage across the 11 Ω load resistor 
with an oscilloscope. 
d) Separate parts and re-perform electrical tests of Step 3a at -55 °C, +25 °C and 125 °C.  
Capture curve tracer plots via electronic image capture or photographic means for all 
parts. 
e) Repeat step 3b). 
f) Re-establish the original Darlington pairing and perform the tests in Table 1 of 
Honeywell drawing 34024047 (Figure 4).  
g) Perform MIL-STD–1580 non-destructive tests on each part (fine and gross hermeticity, 
particle induced noise detection (PIND) and radiographic) 
h) Perform PIND tests on individual transistors using the methods specified in MIL-STD-
750D (Notice 3, or later), Method 2052.2, Test Condition A.  In addition to the acoustic 
detection described in the method, monitor for electrical conduction using the circuits 
depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3.  Capture evidence of transistor conduction by 
monitoring the voltage across the 1 kΩ load resistor using a digital storage oscilloscope.  
Should they occur, record representative instances of conduction via electronic image 
capture or photograph. 
i) Continue with destructive DPA tests per MIL-STD–1580 (residual gas analysis (RGA), 
internal visual, scanning electron microscope (SEM), bond pull, die shear).  RGA shall be 
conducted on only two of the four flight spare/flown Darlington pairs, to be identified by 
the NASA representatives.  Record observations photographically, as appropriate. 
 
4) NESC Pathfinder Transistor Testing, Remaining 92 Transistors 
 
a) Perform electrical tests on the remaining forty-six (46) 2N5038 transistors at -55 °C, 
+25 °C and +125 °C, utilizing a curve tracer.  Capture curve tracer plots via electronic 
image capture or photographic means for all parts.  Ensure that temperatures have 
stabilized before recording the data and that the plots have sufficient magnification to 
enable the values for leakage current to be resolved. When performing these tests, VCE 
shall be limited to 100 Vdc.  Operational parameters shall be restricted as necessary to 
stay within the operating limits specified in MIL-S-19500/439. 
b) Perform electrical tests on the remaining forty-six (46) 2N5665 transistors at -55 °C, 
+25 °C and +125 °C, utilizing a curve tracer.  Capture curve tracer plots via electronic 
image capture or photographic means for all parts.  Ensure that temperatures have 
stabilized before recording the data and that the plots have sufficient magnification to 
enable the values for leakage current to be resolved. When performing these tests, VCE 
shall be limited to 300 Vdc.  Operational parameters shall be restricted as necessary to 
stay within the operating limits specified in MIL-S-19500/455A. 
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Figure 4. Honeywell Drawing 34024047 
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Appendix E 
 
RJD Shielded Wire Dry Arc-Track Test 
  
Rick Gilbrech, NESC  
757-864-2400  
February 11, 2005 
 
Objective of Test 
 
To determine which Reaction Jet Driver valve-coil wire harness configuration has better 
resistance against arc-tracking.  Options are:  1) unshielded wire, no over wrap (baseline 
Orbiter); 2) shielded wire, no over wrap; 3) shielded wire with protective over wrap; and 4) 
unshielded wire with protective over wrap.  The protective over wrap will be PTFE wrap, Mystik 
7503 tape or Teflon convoluted tubing (#MB0150-081).  All wiring samples and protective over 
wrap materials will be supplied by the NESC. 
 
Wire Needed 
 
 300-ft. of twisted-pair 20AWG polyimide replacement Orbiter wire per MB0150-048 
 200-ft. of twisted-pair shielded and jacketed 20 AWG polyimide replacement Orbiter 
wire 
 100-ft. of twisted-quad 20AWG polyimide replacement Orbiter wire per MB0150-048 
 
NOTE: Fabrication of harnesses will be done by Lectromec following the Space 
Shuttle Program wiring specs ML030-0014 rev. N and ML030-0013 rev. D 
provided by the NESC. 
 
Harness No. 1 Configuration 
 
See Figure E-2.  The 30VDC power and return wires are twisted-pair 20AWG wires, 
approximately 16 inches long.  The Fuel and Ox wires are a twisted quad, unshielded. The 
30VDC wires are fused to sustain maximum arc track length, yet protect the power supply.  The 
Fuel and Ox wires are to be monitored for current induced from the arc. The 30VDC power and 
return wires shall be positioned next to the Fuel and Ox coil wires in the bundle.  All harnesses 
are fabricated and spot-tied with Nomex lacing cord per ML030-0013 and ML030-0014. 
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Harness No. 2 Configuration 
 
See Figure E-2.  The 30VDC power and return wires are twisted-pair 20AWG wires, 
approximately 16 inches long.  The Fuel and Ox wires are two, twisted, shielded and jacketed 
pairs, and are to be monitored for current induced from the arc.  The 30VDC power and return 
wires shall be positioned next to the Fuel and Ox coil wires in the bundle.  All harnesses are 
fabricated and spot-tied with Nomex lacing cord per ML030-0013 and ML030-0014. 
 
Harness No. 3 Configuration 
 
See Figure E-1.  The 30VDC power and return wires are twisted-pair 20AWG wires, 
approximately 16 inches long.  The Fuel and Ox wires are two twisted, shielded and jacketed 
pairs with protective over wrap combinations called out in Table E-1 and are to be monitored for 
current induced from the arc.  The 30VDC power and return wires shall be positioned next to the 
Fuel and Ox coil wires in the bundle.  Install the protective over wrap configurations called out 
in Table E-1 per ML030-0014 and ML030-0013.   All harnesses are fabricated and spot-tied with 
Nomex lacing cord per ML030-0013 and ML030-0014.   
 
 
Figure E-1.  Aft Engine Area 
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Harness No. 4 Configuration 
 
See Figure E-2.  The 30VDC power and return wires are twisted-pair 20AWG wires, 
approximately 16 inches long.  The Fuel and Ox wires are two twisted pairs with protective over 
wrap combinations called out in Table E-1 and are to be monitored for current induced from the 
arc.  The 30VDC power and return wires shall be positioned next to the Fuel and Ox coil wires in 
the bundle.  Install the protective over wrap configurations called out in Table E-1 per ML030-
0014 and ML030-0013.   All harnesses are fabricated and spot-tied with Nomex lacing cord per 
ML030-0013 and ML030-0014.   
 
Equipment 
 
- Class II Primary Thruster Valve Assembly with mated flight connector and pigtail 
terminated with 4-pin connector (NESC to supply) 
- Power supply, 30VDC, 20A 
- Arc-Track testing machine (vibrating aluminum blade) 
- Circuit protection fuses of appropriate size 
- Chart recorder 
- Video camera 
- Camera with macro 
 
 
Test Procedure 
 
1. On each thruster harness, perform wet dielectric withstand voltage test per MIL-STD-
2223 Method 3005. 
2. Install Harness No. 1 into the Arc-Track testing machine. 
3. Connect the Thruster Valve Assembly to both the Fuel coil and Ox coil wires via the 
pigtail 4-pin connector.  Instrument the wires to measure current and voltage. 
4. Abrade the 30VDC wire with the grounded blade from the Arc-Track testing 
machine, while vibrating the blade. 
5. Record the current in the 30VDC supply circuits.  Once an arc-track starts in a 
30VDC twisted-pair wire, monitor and record any resultant current flow in the 11-
ohm Fuel and Ox load wires. 
6. Repeat Step 1. 
7. Repeat test for four more sample harnesses (five total). 
8. Repeat the above test on Harness No. 2, for five sample harnesses. 
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9. Repeat the above test on Harness No. 3, for five sample harnesses of each 
configuration in Table E-1 (60 total). 
10. Repeat the above test on Harness No. 4, for five sample harnesses of each 
configuration in Table E-1 (60 total). 
  
TABLE E-1 
Harness No. 3 & 4 Over wrap Protection Schemes 
Fabricate per Space Shuttle Program wiring spec ML0303-0013 and ML0303-0014 
  
First (or bottom) Layer  Second (or top) Layer  
PTFE Wrap None 
Mystik 7503 Tape None 
Teflon Convoluted Tubing None 
PTFE Wrap PTFE Wrap 
PTFE Wrap Mystik 7503 Tape 
PTFE Wrap Teflon Convoluted Tubing 
Mystik 7503 Tape PTFE Wrap 
Mystic 7503 Tape Mystik 7503 Tape 
Mystik 7503 Tape Teflon Convoluted Tubing 
Teflon Convoluted Tubing PTFE Wrap* 
Teflon Convoluted Tubing Mystik 7503 Tape* 
Teflon Convoluted Tubing Teflon Convoluted Tubing 
 
* Note this protective over wrap configuration is not in the Shuttle spec.  Follow same 
instructions of any 2 layer wrap with PTFE or Mystik 7503 tape as the second (or top) layer. 
 
 
 
Figure E-2. 
Note:  Not all wires in each bundle are shown.
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Appendix F  
 
 Aerospace Darlington Transistor Assessment Report 
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Appendix G 
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Appendix H 
 
Team Member Biographies 
 
H-1. Dr. Richard Gilbrech (LaRC) - NESC Principal Engineer 
H-2. Robert Kichak (GSFC) - NESC Avionics Discipline Expert  
H-3. Mitch Davis (GSFC) - Electrical Systems Branch 
H-4. Glenn Williams (GRC) - Avionics 
H-5. Walter Thomas (GSFC) - Reliability Engineer  
H-6. George Slenski (WPAFB) - Principal Technologist Electronic Matls. Eval. 
H-7. Mark Hetzel (JPL) - Wiring 
 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Report 
Document #: 
RP-05-18 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Space Shuttle Orbiter Reaction Jet Driver (RJD) 
Independent Technical Assessment/Inspection Report 
Page #: 
H-2 
 
 
H.1 Dr. Richard “Rick” Gilbrech began his career with NASA at the Stennis Space Center 
(SSC) in 1991 starting in Propulsion Test Technology.  He next served as Project Manager for a 
liquid hydrogen foil bearing turbopump test program.  In 1995, he was selected as the SSC X-30 
National Aerospace Plane Project Manager responsible for construction, activation and operation 
of a facility to test actively-cooled structures.  In the same year he was also selected as the X-33 
Project Manager converting the A-1 test stand at SSC from Space Shuttle Main Engine testing to 
Linear Aerospike turbopump, single and dual engine testing.  He then served as Chief of the 
Propulsion Test Engineering Directorate from 1998 to 2000 until departing for a six-month detail 
at Johnson Space Center (JSC) as the technical assistant to the Space Shuttle Program Manager.  
He returned to SSC and was selected as Deputy Director of Propulsion Test.  In 2003, Dr. 
Gilbrech became Manager of the Program Integration Office responsible for managing NASA’s 
rocket propulsion test facilities located at SSC, Marshall Space Flight Center, JSC’s White Sands 
Test Facility, and Glenn Research Center’s Plumbrook Station.  He relocated to NASA Langley 
Research Center in late 2003 to serve as a Principal Engineer for the NASA Engineering and 
Safety Center (NESC).  In December 2004, the NESC selected Dr. Gilbrech as their new Deputy 
Director.  Dr. Gilbrech received a B.S. degree in Aerospace Engineering from Mississippi State 
University, and his M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in Aeronautics from the California Institute of 
Technology. 
 
H.2 Mr. Robert Kichak began his career with NASA-GSFC in 1965 as a co-op student from 
Cleveland State University.  After graduation in 1969, he developed various flight DC-to-DC 
power converters for IMP-I/H/J, RAE-B, OSO-I, IUE, and HEAO-B.  From 1977 to 1982, he 
served on the Multimission Modular Spacecraft (MMS) Project.  There, his duties evolved from 
power subsystem engineer to Manager and Technical Officer for the Modular Power Subsystem 
for SMM and Landsats 4 & 5, to MMS Flight Support System Integration and Test Manager.  In 
1982, he was appointed Head of the Payload Interfaces and Instrument Power Section, where he 
led development of power electronics for COBE instruments and for the Gamma Ray 
Observatory (GRO) Energetic Gamma Ray Explorer telescope (EGRET) instrument.  He served 
as Head of the Space Power Applications Branch from 1985 to 1992, where he supported the 
Hubble Space Telescope (HST), GRO, UARS, and GGS.  From 1992 to 2001, he served as 
Associate Chief of the Electrical Engineering Division.  Mr. Kichak then served as the Division's 
Chief Engineer where he chaired or served on several anomaly resolution and technical review 
teams.  Mr. Kichak has one patent and two technical papers, and was awarded the NASA 
Exceptional Service Medal in 1995 for his contributions in the development of spaceborne power 
systems.  In 2003, he served as an instructor for the space power segment of a satellite design 
graduate class at the University of Maryland, and was awarded the GSFC Award of Merit.  In his 
current role, Mr. Kichak serves as the NESC Discipline Expert for Power and Avionics.  
 
H.3 Mr. Mitchell Davis has 20 years expertise in electrical and electronic systems, all with 
NASA GSFC.  As GSFC’s Branch Chief Engineer, he is recognized as an expert in space flight 
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electronics architecture, space flight electronics design/development/test/validation, and system 
level electromagnetic compatibility.  Mr. Davis provides electrical design and technical guidance 
for flight projects, spacecraft electrical architectures, grounding concepts, and general 
electromagnetic compatibility practices for spacecraft.  When required, he supports formal 
engineering boards and participates in nearly 20 GSFC review boards a year.  The formal 
engineering boards include pre-launch anomaly cost/risk assessments as well as on-orbit failure 
investigations.  Recent pre-launch investigation accomplishments include, for example, the 
SIRTF spacecraft to IRAC electromagnetic interference anomaly discovered only months before 
launch.  As co-chairman, Mr. Davis led the investigation, identified the root cause of the 
interference and implemented a cost-effective resolution.  Project managers frequently request 
Mr. Davis’ expertise in space flight electronics as a consultant, peer reviewer, or as a member of 
the Code-300 team.  Mr. Davis has a B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering (1984) and has 
received numerous Group Achievement Awards, Performance Awards, and received the NASA 
Medal for Exceptional Service in June 2003.  He has authored/co-authored several technical 
publications. 
  
H.4 Mr. Glenn L. Williams worked for 18 years as a digital and software engineer before 
starting a 15-year career at GRC in Code DD, Diagnostics and Data Systems Branch.  He spent 
over 2 years of military time in the Army Signal Corps. After 16 years in industry, Mr. Williams 
was promoted to Manager of Development at Gould Electronics, Instrument Systems Division in 
Cleveland, Ohio, a non-defense branch of Gould Electronics Inc.  He is a co-inventor on five 
Gould patents and was the digital engineer on a team receiving a 1980 IR-100 award. After a 
Gould downsizing in 1989, he brought his Mentor Graphics CAE and digital experience to 
NASA (Lewis) where he invented the “Video Event Trigger” now patented and licensed to ATM 
maker Diebold Corp. Mr. Williams has authored several papers on microprocessor and digital 
signal processing. At GRC in 1989-1992, in addition to getting the Mentor Graphics system 
running and contributing to the design of circuit boards for the STDCE/USML1 microgravity 
mission on STS-50, he supported various electronics and Schlieren optics tasks. From 1992-
1994, he supported the electrical and optical design of the GRC 270 kilowatt solar simulator. 
From 1994 to 2003, he supported image processing hardware and “C” software on Combustion 
Module-1 (STS-83 and STS-94) and later on Combustion Module-2 as Lead Avionics Engineer 
for CM-2 on Shuttle Columbia (STS-107).  He worked as Lead Software Engineer on a new 
microgravity project in the area of spectrophotometry until funding cuts in the spring of 2004. He 
currently has a new project in biomedical image processing software in MATLAB and C/C++.  
Mr. Williams is a 2004 recipient of a Silver Snoopy Award for his work on CM-2, including the 
recovery of data from damaged solid state data recorders.  Mr. Williams holds a B.S. in 
Engineering from the California Institute of Technology and an M.S.E.E. from University of 
Utah.  
 
H.5 Mr. Walter Thomas has 16 years of industry experience in product and process 
research, development and engineering, manufacturing, and quality assurance in the glass, 
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electronic component and packaging industries. He has consulted for component suppliers and 
aerospace manufacturers in glass and ceramic sealing technologies and technical glass 
applications. He has worked at NASA’s GSFC for the past 18 years in the areas of electronic 
parts, component and packaging engineering and reliability engineering. He has performed and 
managed reliability engineering tasks (e.g., FMEAs, RBD, predictions, life test assessments, risk 
assessments) for space flight programs, solved problems, and provided risk assessments for part, 
component, and systems issues affecting space flight and other programs. His areas of expertise 
include Weibull and other statistical analyses, field performance evaluations, system modeling, 
and technical and electronic glass applications. He presently works as a Reliability Engineer in 
the NASA GSFC Systems Safety and Reliability Office. Mr. Thomas holds a B. Ceramic 
Engineering from Georgia Institute of Technology and a M.S., Ceramic Engineering, from the 
University of Illinois.  
 
H.6 Mr. George A. Slenski has worked in the area of electronic failure analysis for the 
United States Air Force since 1980. Since 1990, Mr. Slenski has been the lead engineer in the 
electronic materials evaluation group that is responsible for planning, organizing, and conducting 
Air Force electronic failure analysis and materials evaluations on fielded and new systems.  He 
has personally conducted several hundred failure investigations, with many supporting aircraft 
mishap boards. Mr. Slenski also evaluates state-of-the-art electronic assemblies and provides 
management with performance and production risk assessments of new technology.  Tasks have 
included performing hardware audits, field investigations, mishap investigations, corrosion 
surveys, and assessing the materials and manufacturing process capabilities of DOD contractor 
facilities.  Mr. Slenski has managed efforts that have developed new aerospace wire insulations; 
a handbook for conducting electrically-related mishap investigations, and a program for 
developing a life prediction system for aging wiring systems. Mr. Slenski is presently the 
Principal Technologist in the Electronic Materials Evaluation Group in the Air Force Research 
Laboratory’s Materials Directorate. He has co-authored several chapters in failure analysis 
handbooks related to electronic packaging, wiring, and general failure techniques, has guest 
lectured on electronic failure analysis techniques, and presented over thirty technical papers. He 
is also the Air Force representative to the SAE aerospace committees on wire and cable and 
electrical and electronic distribution systems. Recent activities have included testifying as a 
wiring expert at the NTSB public hearing on the TWA 800 aircraft accident, member of the 1999 
NASA Shuttle Independent Assessment Team that reviewed the space shuttle’s overall 
reliability, technical consultant on the Columbia accident board related to electrical systems and 
a technical contributor to the FAA aging aircraft sub-committee on wiring inspection.  Mr. 
Slenski was the senior DoD technical lead for the White House initiated study entitled “Review 
of Federal Programs for Wire System Safety”.  Mr. Slenski’s current emphasis area is on 
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Missile. During this time period, he also served as Packaging Engineer for the Standard Missile 
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